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The proliferation of human rights disclosure and due diligence laws around the 
globe is a welcome development in the area of business and human rights. 
Corresponding improvement in conditions for workers and communities in 
global supply chains whose human rights are impacted by businesses has not 
materialized, however. In this article, we focus on the oversight and 
enforcement features of human rights disclosure and due diligence laws as 
among the missing links to achieving the accountability objectives envisaged 
by such legislation. Drawing on our analysis of the key legislative 
developments, we observe and critique that the state has almost completely 
withdrawn itself from the oversight and enforcement roles and assigned these 
crucial accountability functions solely to consumers, civil society, and 
investors. Without a regulatory mechanism to ensure quality of human rights 
disclosures and due diligence processes and impose sanctions for failing to 
comply with the laws, not only may the disclosures and processes be inadequate, 
but there is a danger that misleading disclosures and flawed processes may mask 
harmful impacts and be detrimental to any hopes of vindicating the rights of 
workers and communities in global supply chains. We offer a new perspective 
on a more effective approach to oversight and enforcement in which the state 
should function as a key actor through which consumers, civil society, and 
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In response to intense civil society pressure and the increasing public 
awareness of appalling human rights impacts of businesses including working 
conditions amounting to slavery and forced labor, several governments have 
committed themselves to taking action to prevent human rights abuses by 
businesses and eradicate modern slavery in global supply chains. 1  When it 
comes to the role of parent or lead companies, home state efforts to-date have 
primarily concentrated on increasing transparency. 2  Legislation has been 
adopted in the United States and Europe that requires companies to make annual 
public disclosures containing information about their human rights impacts. 
While transparency can fulfil a useful function alongside other measures in 
ensuring corporate accountability for human rights abuses, it can only do so if 
it is designed diligently and implemented robustly. The design of existing 
human rights transparency rules has allowed highly flawed reporting practices 
to emerge. 3  For instance, a large number of businesses covered under the 
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act fail to disclose all the required 
information, and many do not have a disclosure statement at all.4 Human rights 
disclosures under existing legislation are at best minimal in their reporting of 
risks and at worst misleading about human rights impacts in supply chains and 
subsidiaries.5  
The adoption of the French Law on Corporate Duty of Vigilance and the 
proposals for new human rights due diligence laws,6 recently given significant 
endorsement by the European Union’s announcement that it will enact such a 
 
1 See, e.g., Theresa May, My Government will lead the way in defeating modern slavery, 
DAILY TELEGRAPH (July 30, 2016, 10:01 PM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/30/we-will-lead-the-way-in-defeating-modern-
slavery/. “Modern slavery” is not used as a legal term of art, but rather to encompass 
exploitative practices including forced labor, bonded labor, human trafficking and child labor. 
2 There are, in addition, legal provisions to address domestic instances of modern slavery 
found for instance in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 (United States) 
and the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (UK). 
3 Genevieve LeBaron & Andreas Ruhmkorf, Steering CSR Through Home State Regulation: A 
Comparison of the Impact of the UK Bribery Act and Modern Slavery Act on Global Supply 
Chain Governance, 8 GLOBAL POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 3,15 (2017); Risk Averse: Company 
Reporting on Raw Material and Sector-Specific Risks under the Transparency in Supply 
Chains clause in the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015, 3 CORE COALITION (2017), 
https://corporateresponsibility.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/171003_Risk-Averse-FINAL-
1.pdf; Justine Nolan, Hardening Soft Law: Are the Emerging Corporate Social Disclosure 
Laws Capable of Generating Substantive Compliance with Human Rights?, 15 BRAZILIAN J. 
INT’L L. 65 (2018). See also, Human Rights and Business 2017: Promoting responsibility and 
ensuring accountability, UK HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
(Apr. 4 2017) https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtrights/443/44302.htm. 
4 Andrew G. Barna, The Early Eight and the Future of Consumer Legal Activism to Fight 
Modern-Day Slavery in Corporate Supply Chains, 59 WM & MARY L. REV. 1449, 1463 
(2018) (citing the statistic that only 62% of covered companies disclosed). 
5 See, e.g., CORE COALITION, supra note 3. 
6 See, e.g., 25 NGOs and trade unions call for a UK law on mandatory human rights due 
diligence, CORE COALITION (2019), https://corporate-responsibility.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/190417_UK-mHRDD-campaign-statement_FINAL-with-logos.pdf. 
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law in 2021, 7  promise to address some of the design shortcomings of 
transparency focused laws. The process of human rights due diligence (HRDD) 
requires companies to identify, prevent, mitigate, and communicate risks to 
human rights.8 If done properly, it can achieve real transformation of corporate 
behavior and prevention of harms.9  Company reports of human rights impacts 
and due diligence provide information to stakeholders to enable them to make 
informed choices in their interactions with the corporation. Push for 
transformation can come from external or internal sources – information found 
in reports might trigger external stakeholder pressure to transform corporate 
behavior, or the process of information gathering/disclosing may influence 
internal decision-making. 10  But to be able to fulfil the transformation and 
prevention functions, HRDD must be done properly and reporting must contain 
information that is accurate and that provides a complete and meaningful picture 
of the issues that are being disclosed. The current design of the transparency 
and HRDD laws imposes requirements to disclose or carry out HRDD, but with 
limited exceptions, it does not contain adequate safeguards to ensure duties are 
carried out properly and in accordance with the relevant legislation.   
  Most worryingly, the transparency and due diligence rules discussed in 
this article typically require minimal substantive disclosure and largely adopt 
only “non-coercive enforcement” 11  which leaves the watchdog role to 
consumers, investors, and NGOs,12 without a public oversight mechanism and 
with very limited possibilities for legal action for disclosing misleading 
information. Without a regulatory oversight mechanism to ensure quality of 
disclosures and impose sanctions for misleading information, not only may the 
reporting be inadequate, but there is a danger that such disclosures may present 
false realities and be detrimental to any hopes of improving rights of workers 
and communities in the global supply chain. The question of oversight and 
enforcement remains underexplored in the literature, however.   
This article contributes to the on-going discussions about how to 
improve human rights disclosure and due diligence laws to achieve their stated 
aims. It has been observed and critiqued that the oversight and enforcement 
features of these laws remain weak or non-existent.13 Taking this as our starting 
point, we propose greater state involvement in transnational business regulation 
as it concerns human rights impacts of businesses. We argue that state-based 
 
7 EU to Legislate for Human Rights and Environmental Due Diligence, HAUSFELD LLP 
(2020), https://www.hausfeld.com/perspectives/ec-to-legislate-for-human-rights-and-
environmental-due-diligence?lang_id=1. 
8 U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 
¶15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). 
9 Robert G. Eccles & George Serafeim, Corporate and Integrated Reporting: A Functional 
Perspective, in STEWARDSHIP OF THE FUTURE (Susan A. Mohrman et al. eds., 2015); Karin 
Buhmann, Neglecting the Proactive Aspect of Human Rights Due Diligence? A Critical 
Appraisal of the EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive as a Pillar One Avenue for 
Promoting Pillar Two Action, 3 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 23, 35 (2018). 
10 Id. 
11 Tim Bartley, RULES WITHOUT RIGHTS: LAND, LABOR, AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 7, 12, 40 (Oxford, 2018). (Corporate codes of conduct and private social 
or ethical audits are the prime examples of this mode of governance). 
12 Adam S. Chilton & Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes, 
53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2017). 
13 See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 3, at 70 and LeBaron & Ruhmkorf, supra note 3. 
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enforcement and oversight constitute necessary ingredients for public 
disclosures and due diligence to contribute to the improvement of human rights 
conditions in supply chains and achieving accountability for adverse business 
impacts on human rights. We offer a new framing of the problem by analyzing 
how these laws assign oversight and enforcement roles between the state and 
the market.  We critique that the state has almost completely withdrawn itself 
from the oversight and enforcement roles and assigned these crucial 
accountability functions primarily to consumers, civil society, and investors. As 
we discuss below, even for the French Law, civil society acts as the main driver 
for oversight. We offer a new perspective on a more effective approach to 
oversight and enforcement that distinguishes human rights disclosures and due 
diligence from traditional corporate reporting and due diligence. Our approach 
assigns these functions primarily to a public authority which should have 
expertise in both corporate governance and human rights, and which would also 
function as an enabler for consumers, civil society, and investors to hold 
businesses accountable.  
The article begins in Part II by unpacking the concept of accountability 
in the context of business impacts on human rights. Next, in Part III, it outlines 
and compares the due diligence and reporting requirements under key examples 
of the relevant legislation: the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive (enacted 
2014), the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance of 2017, the 
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (CTSCA); the UK 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 (MSA); the Australian Modern Slavery Act 2018 
(AMSA); the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 s.1502, the EU Conflict Minerals 
Regulation (enacted 2017) and the Dutch Child Labor Law (enacted 2019). In 
doing so, it addresses briefly the reasons behind the enactment of the legislation, 
the transparency and due diligence requirements they contain, and the 
institutional arrangements supporting these, to give the reader context for the 
discussion that follows.  
The analysis section, Parts IV and V, building on the existing scholarship,14 
highlights the potential contribution to corporate accountability and the 
limitations of the existing legislation. In Part VI, we argue that enforcement of 
these laws via regulatory oversight is essential, alongside market oversight, for 
achieving their accountability objectives. We evaluate the options for regulatory 
oversight of human rights due diligence and reporting. Here, we analyze the 
distinguishing features of human rights reporting from financial and other types 
of non-financial reporting (diversity, governance, environmental). We urge 
policymakers to move away from placing human rights due diligence and 
reporting within the realm of traditional corporate reporting and instead to adopt 
a sui generis model of oversight that marries corporate reporting expertise with 
human rights expertise.  
 
 
14 Justine Nolan, Human Rights and Global Corporate Supply Chains: Is effective supply 
chain accountability possible?, in BUILDING A TREATY ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
CONTEXT AND CONTOURS 248 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2017);  Chilton & Sarfaty, 
supra note 12. 
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II. What is accountability in this context and what are the various 
tools for accountability? 
 
Corporate accountability represents a movement away from voluntarism 
and self-regulation that traditionally characterize corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). 15  For Newell, “the term implies both a measure of answerability 
(providing an account for actions undertaken) and enforceability (punishment 
or sanctions for poor performance or illegal conduct)”. 16  In the context of 
business impacts on human rights, we conceive of accountability as a wider 
concept than liability, encompassing the idea that companies should be held to 
account for the consequences of their actions via non-legal accountability (risks 
of loss of reputation, denial of access to foreign markets, fall in share price and 
shareholder dissent) as well as legal accountability, which can be imposed by 
regulators or enforced in a court of law.17 We concur with Zadek’s common 
sense opinion that “[f]or accountability to work, there must be capability to do 
something about a given action and some level of consensus about the action 
that needs to be accounted for and the penalties for poor performance / illegal 
conduct. There needs to be a reasonably defined community that can reach 
decisions on these matters.”18  
In following Zadek’s criteria one must first determine what needs to be 
accounted for in the context of transparency and due diligence for human rights 
abuses present in a company’s supply chains or subsidiaries. Second, one must 
determine what consequences and penalties may attach to performance which 
falls below the expected/required standard, and what processes are needed to 
assess compliance and impose sanctions.  
Determining the scope of accountability can be a complex task where 
the disclosure obligations are placed on parent or lead companies even though 
the presence of human rights abuses in those companies’ subsidiaries or supply 
chains may not be contrary to any legal requirement or obligation placed on the 
parent / lead company. The corporate law concepts of corporate personality and 
limited liability and the contractual nature of relationships with suppliers 
insulate parent / lead companies from liability for harm caused by subsidiaries 
/ suppliers. Therefore, at least in theory, legal liability falls on the subsidiary, 
supplier, or sub supplier that is directly linked to the human rights harm rather 
than the lead company that sells the end-product.19  For instance, the MSA 
imposes criminal liability for slavery and human trafficking that take place 
within the United Kingdom only.20 Accountability arises from the presence of 
 
15 See, e.g., Renginee G. Pillay, The Limits to Self-regulation and Voluntarism: From 
Corporate Social Responsibility to Corporate Accountability, 99 AMICUS CURIAE 10 (2014). 
16 Peter Newell, From Responsibility to Citizenship: Corporate Accountability for 
Development, 33 IDS BULLETIN 91 (2002). 
17 David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of 
Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in 
Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 334, 335 (2011). 
18 Simon Zadek, The Meaning of Accountability, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM 
PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE 241 (Dorothée Baumann-Pauly & Justine Nolan eds., 2016). 
19 Although it is possible for a parent or a lead company to be directly liable for the harms 
suffered as a result of subsidiary’s acts or omissions – See, Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources 
Plc, [2019] UKSC 20; Chandler v. Cape Plc, [2012] EWCA Civ 525. The French Law on the 
Corporate Duty of Vigilance places a legal requirement on the parent company to conduct due 
diligence in its supply chain, see below, Part III. 
20 Modern Slavery Act, §§ 1-2 (2015). 
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slavery within a business organization. In contrast, supply chain accountability 
for slavery and human trafficking overseas through the Act is to be achieved 
through disclosure of the steps taken to identify and eliminate these practices.21 
Unlike the former type of criminal accountability that applies in the domestic 
context, the latter obligation is neither an obligation of result nor an obligation 
of due diligence to eliminate slavery within supply chains. Instead, it is an 
obligation to report the steps, if any, taken to eliminate slavery. The presence of 
human rights abuses and modern slavery practices legally distant from the 
parent or lead company renders it difficult to define what action needs to be 
accounted for in modern slavery or human rights disclosures, particularly if a 
legally mandated due diligence obligation is lacking.  
We take as our starting point the action that needs to be accounted for 
as a failure on a parent or lead company’s part to make diligent efforts to 
identify, prevent, mitigate, and eliminate human rights abuses in its subsidiaries 
and supply chains and disclose appropriately the steps taken.22  This is just one 
piece of the wider puzzle of accountability. We are not looking at other pieces 
of the puzzle such as the role of state oversight and enforcement through civil 
or criminal liability for human rights harms. Relatedly, we are not looking at 
this from the perspective of access to remedy. Our concern is whether the 
current disclosure and HRDD frameworks have the capability to contribute to 
accountability both to those affected by business impacts, and to those affected 
indirectly as consumers, customers, or investors who buy from and/or invest in 
the company on the understanding that it is doing all that can be reasonably 
expected to prevent and remediate human rights abuses and modern slavery in 
its global supply chains.  
There is a spectrum of regulatory approaches to bringing about 
corporate accountability in terms of the consequences that will attach to poor 
performance, ranging from light-touch (private led regulation) through to 
stringent regulation with binding standards enforced by public authorities.23 
LeBaron and Ruhmkorf observe that home state regulation on business and 
human rights has been “enacted through a range of different institutional 
designs that combine elements and instruments of public and private 
governance.”24 That said, as will be seen in Part III below, a heavy emphasis 
has thus far been placed on various degrees of transparency accompanied with 
market centered accountability mechanisms, at the light-touch end of the 
spectrum. This mode of regulation is a move away traditional “command and 
control” regulation in which governments adopt “legal rules backed by [civil or 
 
21 Id. § 54. 
22 This accords with the due diligence requirements of the U.N. Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, ¶22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 
(Mar. 21, 2011). 
23 LeBaron & Ruhmkorf, supra note 3, at 15. Compare the Bribery Act 2010 (UK) with the 
MSA under these categories and find that the former produced significant changes in 
corporate practice while the latter has not. 
24 Id. at 17. 
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criminal] sanctions”25 towards what is termed “reflexive” regulation,26 or “New 
Governance”. 27  Through this mechanism, the government acts as “the 
orchestrator of private actors to encourage compliance” 28  and attempts to 
“influence normative practices indirectly by shaping the context in which 
society's various actors and subsystems interact and bargain with one 
another.”29 This model has been widely supported by the CSR literature due to 
its promise of affecting organizational and lasting change, 30  whereas the 
command and control type regulation has been viewed with skepticism due to 
its potential to produce a tick-box approach to human rights issues.31 Human 
rights disclosure laws discussed in this article largely adopt this light touch 
regulation model based on market led model of accountability. Recent 
developments suggest a slow gradual movement towards more stringent 
regulation, with a new legislative approach featuring a legal duty to conduct due 
diligence and publish due diligence information backed by certain penalties and 
civil liability for failure to comply.32 Buhmann has argued that for the light 
touch approach to be successful, it needs to properly encourage organizational 
learning and not merely focus penalties for non-disclosure. 33  While the 
organizational learning focus is crucial, decades of voluntarism and soft 
regulation in this field have not produced successful outcomes when the bottom-
line of business remains profit oriented. One reason for this lack of meaningful 
progress is the lack of stringent legal accountability mechanisms to push 
businesses to take this seriously. It has been argued by critics of the current 
 
25 David J. Doorey, Who Made That? Influencing Foreign Labor Practices Through Reflexive 
Domestic Disclosure Legislation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 366 (2005). 
26 Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
239 (1983); in the context of the nature of social disclosure rules See, Barnali Choudhury, 
Social Disclosure, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 207 (2016).  
27 David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of 
Achieving Corporate Accountability through Transparency, 17(3) BUS. ETHICS QUART. 453, 
454-455 (2007) (describing New Governance as ‘process-oriented, flexible, participatory, and 
experimental.’) 
28 Nolan, supra note 3, at 70. 
29 Doorey, supra note 25, at 357. 
30 Hess, supra note 27. 
31 See, for an overview and critique of the voluntary and light touch approaches to regulation 
of corporate human rights impacts, Renginee G. Pillay, The Limits to Self-regulation and 
Voluntarism: From Corporate Social Responsibility to Corporate Accountability, 99 AMICUS 
CURIAE 10 (2014); see also Responding to Modern Slavery – New UK Benchmarking Report, 
HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-
thinking/responding-to-modern-slavery-–-new-uk-benchmarking-report. 
32 French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance: Loi no. 2017-399 du 27 Mars 2017 
relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre, 
available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2017/3/27/2017-399/jo/texte; 
 The Netherlands takes an historic step by adopting child labor due diligence law, MVO 
PLATFORM (May 14 2019), https://www.mvoplatform.nl/en/the-netherlands-takes-a-historic-
step-by-adopting-child-labour-due-diligence-law/; Frequently Asked Questions about the new 
Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Law, (Apr. 14 2017), https://www.mvoplatform.nl/news-
en/frequently-asked-questions-about-the-new-dutch-child-labour-due-diligence-law. See also, 
Saskia Wilks & Johannes Blankenbach, Will Germany Become a Leader in the Drive for 
Corporate Due Diligence on Human Rights?, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE 
CENTRE (Feb. 20 2019), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/will-germany-become-a-
leader-in-the-drive-for-corporate-due-diligence-on-human-rights; SWISS COALITION FOR 
CORPORATE JUSTICE, https://corporatejustice.ch. 
33 Buhmann, supra note 9, at 39. 
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transparency rules that without, as a minimum, an accompanying due diligence 
obligation and civil, administrative, or criminal liability for failure to comply, 
these rules cannot effectively contribute to corporate accountability. 34  The 
analysis in the latter parts of this article discusses the necessity for state-based 
oversight and enforcement supported by stakeholders as an essential ingredient 
for the efficacy of any laws, whether they comprise transparency obligations 
only or they include the additional requirement of due diligence. This is crucial 
to ensuring the avoidance of a disconnect between what is reported in corporate 
disclosures and the actual the human rights situation on the ground.35 
Both transparency and human rights due diligence are requirements of 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).36 The 
UNGPs, which were adopted unanimously by the UN Human Rights Council 
in 2011, represent a consensus of opinion among a number of states, and some 
companies and non-governmental organizations, about the human rights 
responsibilities of corporations. Human rights due diligence and the reporting 
of this are the way that the ‘corporate responsibility to respect’ pillar of the 
UNGPs is ‘operationalized’37 by corporate actors. Businesses are expected to 
communicate the steps they take to address human rights impacts by publishing 
sufficiently detailed information on the impacts and steps taken to prevent, 
mitigate and remediate these in appropriate form and frequency.38 
The Commentary on reporting explains that ‘showing’ that they respect 
human rights involves companies communicating and “providing a measure of 
transparency and accountability to individuals or groups who may be impacted 
and to other relevant stakeholders, including investors.”39 Thus, reporting under 
the UNGPs is not an end in itself but, theoretically at least, is an exercise that 
will provide a measure of accountability.40 Reporting alone is not sufficient, 
however, and the reporting provisions in the UNGPs are supplemented by a 
requirement that companies conduct human rights due diligence, a process that 
entails identifying whether they have caused or contributed to adverse human 
rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and 
if an adverse impact has occurred, co-operating with remediation. 41  The 
 
34 LeBaron and Ruhmkorf, supra note 3; Nolan, supra note 3; UK HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3. 
35 For an analysis of such a disconnect, see Madhura Rao & Nadia Bernaz, Corporate 
Responsibility for Human Rights in Assam Tea Plantations - A Business and Human Rights 
Approach, WAGENINGEN L. SERIES (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3567134. 
36 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, supra note 22. 
37 UNGPs 16–24 are the “operational principles” in relation to the corporate responsibility to 
respect pillar. 
38 UNGP 21. For an exploration of reporting under the UNGPs, see UN Guiding Principles 
Reporting Framework, SHIFT & MAZARS (2015), www.ungpreporting.org. 
39 UNGP, Principle 21, Commentary. 
40 This viewpoint is challenged, see, e.g., Jena Martin, Hiding in the Light: The Misuse of 
Disclosure to Advance the Business and Human Rights Agenda, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
530 (2018). 
41 UNGP, Principle 22. On human rights due diligence under the UNGPs, see Björn 
Fasterling, Human Rights Due Diligence as Risk Management: Social Risk Versus Human 
Rights Risk, 2 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 225 (2017); Buhmann, supra note 9; Kendyl Salcito & 
Mark Wielga, What does Human Rights Due Diligence for Business Relationships Really 
Look Like on the Ground?, 3 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 113 (2018). 
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enactment of transparency and human rights due diligence laws are illustrative 
of the polycentric governance described in the UNGPs.  
The knowing and showing approach of the UNGPs has been a welcome 
progress from the naming and shaming approach.42 We argue here that for the 
‘showing’ to be reliable and not misleading, there needs to be a reliable system 
of oversight. While the UNGPs acknowledge the role of transparency in 
achieving corporate accountability, Principle 3 and its commentary leave it up 
to each state to determine the type of transparency measures to be introduced. 
According to Principle 3, the states should encourage or require businesses to 
be transparent on how they address their human rights impacts. As far as 
transparency measures go, the expectations of the UNGPs could be fulfilled by 
states by introducing or maintaining the ‘light- touch’ regulations described 
above mandating reporting without any follow up measures. The UNGPs place 
no clear expectations on states to introduce robust measures of oversight and 
enforcement for transparency requirements. We argue in this article that such 
measures are a crucial element of  transparency and human rights due diligence 
laws to ensure corporate accountability. 
 
III. Key features of human rights disclosure and due diligence laws  
 
We divide the legislation mandating human rights disclosure into two 
main categories: (1) general human rights transparency and due diligence laws 
and (2) laws that target a specific human rights issue.43 The key features of the 
different laws are outlined below, with particular focus on two distinct elements: 
the type of disclosure required and the processes in place (or the lack thereof) 
to ensure accessibility and accuracy of the disclosures. 
 
A. General human rights due diligence and disclosure 
 
In this section, we focus on the EU Non-financial reporting Directive 
(EU NFD)44 and the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance. The EU 
NFD applies to all companies of a certain size governed by laws of individual 
EU Member States.45 These companies are required to report on human rights 
and related matters “to the extent necessary for an understanding of the 
undertaking’s development, performance and position and of the impact of its 
activity.”46 Companies within the scope of these reporting requirements must 
 
42 Buhmann, supra note 9, at 39. 
43 Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 87 (2014), discussed in David Hess, The Transparency Trap: Non-Financial 
Disclosure and the Responsibility of Business to Respect Human Rights, 56 AM. BUS. L. J. 5 
(2019).  
44 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 
amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by certain large undertakings and groups, implemented in the UK by the 
Companies, Partnerships and Groups (Accounts and Non-Financial Reporting) Regulations 
2016, to add s 414CB(1)-(6). 
45 Id. These are certain large companies and qualifying partnerships with more than 500 
employees. 
46 Id. 
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additionally disclose due diligence processes implemented by the company in 
pursing policies related to non-financial matters, the outcome of these, and the 
principal risks arising in connection with the company’s operations, including 
how the company manages these. The provision adopts a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach, meaning that companies can elect to comply with it in one of two 
ways: either by making the required disclosures or by providing an explanation 
for why they have elected not to do so. 47 The Directive leaves it up to each EU 
Member State to determine whether to require verification of reports by an 
independent assurance service provider and whether to have a sanctions regime 
for companies that fail to report adequately. As a minimum, each Member State 
is to require checks by an auditor of the existence of a report.48 Some Member 
States have, through their implementing legislation, required these disclosures 
to be made in the management report,49 and some have imposed additional 
checks.50 Thus Member States vary in the checks they have in place. 
Turning next to the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance, this 
requires companies meeting the threshold requirements for size51 to create and 
implement an annual ‘vigilance plan’ aimed at identifying and preventing 
human rights violations in both their domestic and their international operations, 
including those associated with their subsidiaries and supply chain. 52  The 
development and the publication of the plan and a report on its implementation 
are among the substantive obligations prescribed by the ‘duty of vigilance’.53 
The plan must set out the steps that the company will take to detect risks and 
prevent serious violations with respect to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, health and safety and the environment.54 This includes mapping out 
and analyzing the risks, and putting measures in place to mitigate risks and 
address negative impacts, including an alert mechanism and a monitoring 
 
47 Virginia E. Harper Ho, Comply or Explain and the Future of Nonfinancial Reporting, 21 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 317, 321 (2017). 
48 According to a study reviewing how member states have transposed the directive into their 
national law, 20 member states only require the existence of the reports to be verified and not 
the content. The states are Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Norway. See Global Reporting Initiative, Member State 
Implementation of Directive 2014/95/EU: A Comprehensive Overview of how Member States 
are Implementing the EU Directive on Non-financial and Diversity Information, CSR EUROPE 
1, 16-31 (2017). 
49 Id. Eight states require consistency checks with the management report. Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, UK and Iceland. 
50 For instance, Denmark. This subject is taken up in Part VI below. 
51 The law applies to any company registered in France that has (a) 5,000 or more employees, 
including employees of its direct or indirect French-registered subsidiaries; or (b) 10,000 or 
more employees, including employees of its direct or indirect French-registered or foreign 
subsidiaries: see Loi no. 2017-399, supra note 32, at art. 1. It is estimated that the law applies 
to about 150 companies: Anna Triponel & John Sherman, Legislating Human Rights Due 
Diligence: Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls to the French Duty of Vigilance Law, 
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION (2017). 
52 This covers the companies that the company controls directly or indirectly and, moving down 
the supply chain, the activities of its subcontractors and suppliers ‘with which [it] maintains an 
established commercial relationship’, see Loi no. 2017-399, supra note 32, at art. 1, ¶ 3.  
53 Stéphane Brabant & Elsa Savourey, France’s Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law: A Closer 
Look at the Penalties Faced by Companies, INT’L REV. OF COMPLIANCE & BUS. ETHICS 1, 2 
(2017). 
54 Loi no. 2017-399, supra note 32.  
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scheme to follow up on the plan’s implementation.55 Unlike most of the other 
laws discussed in this article, the French law’s transparency requirement can 
only be fulfilled by complying. There is no room for compliance by explaining 
why no steps have been taken, as taking the prescribed steps is a fundamental 
obligation placed on companies covered under the law. Since the development 
of the plan, its implementation, and the communication of these constitute 
together the vigilance duty, the French law brings together the HRDD and 
transparency elements of the UNGPs second pillar discussed above in Part II.  
Compliance with the law is established through a court process whereby 
companies can be legally compelled, at the request of a party with standing, 
including an NGO or a trade union, to create and implement an adequate 
vigilance plan.56 Prior to the initiation of a court process, companies will be 
given a three-month period to comply with the requirements of the law. Periodic 
penalties may be imposed by the court, if companies are found to be failing their 
vigilance obligations. Up to date, a small number of notices have been served 
to companies on the basis of vigilance plans published being inadequate, and 
two of these have proceeded to the courts at the end of the three month notice 
period.57 Accountability also takes place through a process by which victims 
who have been harmed by a company captured by the legislation can claim 
damages for negligence through an ordinary civil lawsuit, using the company’s 
noncompliance with the due diligence obligation as evidence of its 
wrongdoing.58 
Combining HRDD and transparency backed up with sanctions, the 
French law is the most promising piece of legislation presently in force to 
advance corporate accountability. It is not without shortcomings, however. It 
has been highlighted that the law’s threshold for coverage is very high,59 the 
sanctions available are weak in terms of remediating harms,60 and there is a lack 
of governmental monitoring and oversight for compliance by covered 
companies.61 While the French law takes a crucial step by attaching sanctions 
to the vigilance obligations, in the absence of a formal oversight mechanism, it 
is left completely to the civil society organizations (CSOs) to monitor 
companies’ compliance and initiate the complaints procedures available under 
 
55 Id. ¶¶ 4-9.  
56 Id. ¶¶ 7-9; Brabant & Savourey, supra note 53, at 4. 
57 Decisions on the substance of the complaints are pending at the time of writing; See 
Stéphane Brabant & Elsa Savourey, All Eyes on France – France Vigilance Law First 
Enforcement Cases: Current Cases and Trends, CAMBRIDGE CORE BLOG (Jan. 24 2020),  
https://www.cambridge.org/core/blog/2020/01/24/all-eyes-on-france-french-vigilance-law-
first-enforcement-cases-1-2-current-cases-and-trends/#_edn13; Elsa Savourey, All Eyes on 
France – France Vigilance Law First Enforcement Cases: The Challenges Ahead, 
CAMBRIDGE CORE BLOG (Jan. 24 2020), 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/blog/2020/01/24/all-eyes-on-france-french-vigilance-law-
first-enforcement-cases-2-2-current-cases-and-trends/. 
58 Companies would incur civil liability under the French Civil Code Articles 1240 and 1241: 
see Sandra Cossart, Jérôme Chaplier & Tiphaine Beau de Lomenie, The French Law on Duty 
of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All, 2 
 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 317 (2017). 
59 Law on Duty of Vigilance of Parent and Outsourcing Companies Year One: Companies 
Must Do Better, FORUM CITOYEN POUR LA RSE 1, 8 (2019), https://plan-vigilance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/2019.06.14-EN-Rapport-Commun-Companies-must-do-better.pdf. 
60 Brabant & Savourey, supra note 53, at 2-4. 
61 See the civil society initiative attempting to rectify the lack of formal monitoring and 
oversight at https://vigilance-plan.org/duty-of-vigilance-radar/ (last visited 31 May 2020). 
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the law. The lack of an official list and repository for vigilance plans render it 
challenging for CSOs, trade unions and other stakeholders to identify 
shortcomings and take part in the enforcement of the obligations. 62  A 
preliminary proposal has been put forward to address this that would entail 
designating certain individuals, within the French administration, to look into 
which companies are within scope of the law, how the law is implemented and 
whether some provisions of the law need to be clarified.63 A need for formal 
oversight and more robust enforcement constitute the main focus of the analysis 
presented in the later parts of this article.  
 
B. Targeted due diligence and transparency 
 
Targeted due diligence and transparency legislation focuses on specific 
issues, such as modern slavery, child labor, or conflict minerals. In this section, 
we will first examine laws mandating disclosure on modern slavery. The design 
of the three statutes dealing directly with modern slavery is similar although 
each legislative scheme has slight variation.  
The CTSCA, which came into force in January 2012, requires certain 
large retail sellers and manufacturers doing business in the state of California to 
disclose their efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their direct 
supply chain for tangible goods offered for sale.64 The disclosed information 
should be posted on the retail seller or manufacturer’s website. Specifically, a 
company to which the legislation applies must disclose to what extent, if any, 
it: verifies product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of human 
trafficking and slavery; conducts audits of suppliers to evaluate supplier 
compliance with company standards for trafficking and slavery in supply 
chains; requires direct suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the 
product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the 
country or countries in which they are doing business; maintains internal 
accountability standards and procedures for employees or contractors failing to 
meet company standards regarding slavery and trafficking; and provides 
relevant training.65 There is no requirement to update the report on a periodic 
basis. The Californian Franchise Tax Board produces an annual list of 
companies covered by its provisions, based on information from tax returns.66 
There is, however, no official repository where these reports must be deposited 
for public access. A large number of covered businesses fail to disclose 
information on all the required areas of activity, and many do not have a 
 
62 Brabant & Savourey, supra note 57. 
63 Evaluation de la mise en œuvre de la loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de 
vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre, THE MINISTRY OF THE 
ECONOMY AND FINANCE (Jan. 2020),  
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/cge/devoirs-vigilances-
entreprises.pdf.  
64 CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3. 
65 Id. § 3(b). 
66 Kamala Harris, The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act: A Resource Guide, 3 
(2015). Note however that the CTSCA does not require companies to report on an annual 
basis, meaning that companies can comply with the law by reporting just once. 
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disclosure statement at all.67 The only state-based relief under the CTSCA for 
failure to report is injunctive.68 Following a compliance review in 2015, the 
Californian Department of Justice took steps to improve compliance with the 
Act by writing to companies and asking them to provide an explanation of why 
the legislation does not apply to them, or a link to a compliant disclosure.69 To 
date, the Attorney General of California has not yet brought an action against a 
corporation for non-disclosure under the Act.70 From the foregoing, it is not 
possible to conclude that CTSCA contains a robust oversight and enforcement 
of the transparency obligations.  
In the UK, section 54(4) of the MSA, introduced a modern slavery and 
human trafficking transparency requirement for certain ‘commercial 
organizations’ with a turnover of at least £36 million that ‘carry on’ business in 
the UK. The law adopts a comply or explain approach by requiring companies 
to publish either a statement of the steps the organization has taken to ensure 
slavery and human trafficking is not taking place in any of its supply chains or 
in any part of its business, or a statement that the organization has taken no such 
steps.71 The MSA does not prescribe specific content for the disclosures, but 
provides a non-exhaustive list of items that may be included in the ‘slavery and 
human trafficking statement’, including information about a commercial 
organization’s72 policies and due diligence processes in relation to slavery and 
human trafficking in its business and supply chain; the parts of its business most 
at risk of slavery and human trafficking and steps put in place to assess and 
manage that risk, including performance indicators for the success of these 
steps.73 The statement must be approved by the board of directors of a limited 
company or all members of a limited liability partnership.74 The MSA covers 
steps taken in ‘any of [a corporation's] supply chains,’ a broader requirement 
than that in the CTSCA, which covers the direct supply chain only.75 The MSA 
also requires yearly updates, in contrast to the CTSCA’s one-off approach.76 
There is no official list however of companies that are required to report, 
 
67 Andrew G. Barna, The Early Eight and the Future of Consumer Legal Activism to Fight 
Modern-Day Slavery in Corporate Supply Chains, 59 WM & MARY L. REV. 1449, 1463 
(2018) - only 62% of covered companies disclosed. 
68 CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3(d). 
69 Sarah Altschuller, The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act: New Guidance and 
Increased Enforcement Efforts, HOAG FOLEY (May 10 2015), 
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2015/05/10/the-california-transparency-in-supply-chains-act-
new-guidance-and-increased-enforcement-efforts/. 
70 Jena Martin, Background Memo on Policy Options for Addressing and Preventing Forced 
Labor, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking in Supply Chains, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION (May 2020). (on file with authors). 
71 It is estimated that s 54 covers between 12,000 and 17,000 companies. CORE COALITION, 
supra note 3, at 3. 
72 Defined in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, § 54(12) as a body corporate / partnership 
wherever incorporated / formed which carries on a business or part of a business in the UK. 
73 Id. § 54(5). 
74 Id. § 54(6). 
75 Id. § 54(4)(a)(i). Commercial organizations caught within the definition are not however 
required to report on all the supply chains in their groups overseas, such as those of wholly 
owned foreign subsidiaries: Parosha Chandran, A Loophole in the Slavery bill could Allow 
Companies to Hide Supply Chain Abuses, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24 2015),  
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/mar/24/loophole-modern-slavery-
bill-transparency-supply-chain-abuses. 
76 MSA, § 54(4)(a). 
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although the UK Home Office has written to 10,000 companies that it believes 
may be eligible. 77  Nor is there an official database where such reports are 
deposited.78 If a business falling under section 54 fails to report, the Secretary 
of State may bring court proceedings for injunctive relief.79 As yet there has 
been no instance of this happening in practice. There is no other means of 
enforcement or oversight in the Act. Furthermore, there are no mechanisms to 
ensure the accuracy of the report contents (though the report contents can be so 
vague under this law that there seems little need for assurance).  
There have already been three reporting cycles under the MSA. 
Generally, however, disclosure has been of a low standard, not always meeting 
even the minimum requirements of the Act including sign-off at senior level 
and visibility on the company website.80 Many companies have not reported at 
all.81 Acknowledging deficiencies of the MSA, an independent review of the 
Act published in 2019 recommended to the UK Government to abandon the 
comply or explain approach and adopt a comply approach with prescribed 
minimum content for the report, establish a repository for statements, establish 
a monitoring and enforcement mechanism and strengthen sanctions for failure 
to comply.82 
Like the CTSCA and the MSA, the Australian Modern Slavery Act 2018 
(AMSA) requires companies that meet a prescribed size threshold to report on 
the risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains,83 and actions 
taken to assess and address those risks. This law abandons the comply or explain 
approach adopted in the UK MSA. It is mandatory for companies to provide the 
particular information listed in the Act. The Australian MSA also makes 
provision for a government funded central repository for slavery and human 
trafficking statements,84 but it does not penalize companies for noncompliance, 
 
77 Reducing Modern Slavery Inquiry 2018 - UK Parliament, UK HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE 10. 
78 An NGO led initiative aims to fill in this gap, see MODERN SLAVE REGISTRY, 
http://www.modernslaveryregistry.org/ (last visited 1 June 2020). 
79 MSA, § 54(11). 
80FTSE 100 at the Starting Line: An Analysis of Company Statements under the UK Modern 
Slavery Act, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Oct. 2016); CORE 
COALITION, supra note 3; First Year of FTSE 100 Reports under the Modern Slavery Act: 
Towards Elimination?, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Dec. 2017). 
81 According to CORE, 60% of companies that are covered by s.54 have failed to produce a 
report: Written evidence submitted from CORE, CORE COALITION ¶8 (2018), 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/public-
accounts-committee/reducingmodern-slavery/written/78389.pdf.  
82 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Independent Review of the Modern Slavery Act 
2015: Final Report, OGL ¶ 17 (2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/803406/Independent_review_of_the_Modern_Slavery_Act_-_final_report.pdf; See also 
UK HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE, supra note 77, at 6, to read a 
report by the Public Accounts Committee, recommending that the government should 
consider publishing a list of companies that have complied and not complied with the 
legislation, rather than falling back on civil society to undertake this work. The government 
has responded to the report, agreeing to this recommendation, Government Response to the 
Committee of Public Accounts on the Thirty-First to the Thirty-Seventh reports from Session 
2017-19,  HM TREASURY 1, 23 (2018), https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/public-accounts/Cm-9643-Treasury-Minutes-june-2018.pdf. 
83 Companies are required to report if they carry on business in Australia with a minimum 
annual consolidated revenue of AU$100 million – Australian Modern Slavery Act, §5 (2018). 
84 Id. § 18-20. 
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though the Minister for Home Affairs can make an inquiry if a company has not 
complied. If a company fails to respond, the minister may publicly disclose 
information about the company’s failure to comply.85  The law was passed in 
November 2018, and the first disclosure under the Act was made in 2019. In 
terms of ‘enforcement’, the AMSA creates a mechanism through which non-
compliant entities can be asked to explain and remedy their failure to report, or 
risk being named on the government-maintained register. The relevant minister 
will report to parliament annually on compliance trends, enabling oversight of 
overall compliance patterns by parliamentarians. 
Outside the arena of modern slavery, in the United States, the Conflict 
Minerals Rule (adopted by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC, the 
federal independent financial services regulatory body) in 2012 pursuant to the 
federal Dodd-Frank Act s.1502) requires companies reporting to the SEC to 
conduct due diligence and to report on the sourcing of certain minerals (tin, 
tungsten, tantalum, and gold). These companies must make reasonable and good 
faith effort to determine whether the specified minerals used in the manufacture 
of their products originated in the Democratic Republic of Congo and its 
neighboring countries, and to disclose their determinations and describe their 
country of origin inquiries to the SEC and on their public websites.  Where this 
inquiry reveals that the minerals did originate in these countries, the company 
must exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of the mineral, 
in accordance with a nationally or internationally recognized due diligence 
framework.86 Where the due diligence confirms the company’s determination, 
it must file a Conflict Minerals Report with the SEC, and post the same on its 
website. There is no list of companies that must comply with the Conflict 
Minerals Rule but an annual Government Audit Office (GAO) report to 
congressional committees examines how companies responded to the Conflict 
Mineral Rules in the previous calendar year and analyses a generalized random 
sample of company reports. 87  In terms of enforcement and sanctions, the 
Conflict Minerals Rule imposes penalties on companies for not reporting or 
complying in good faith. Form SD (the form used for submitting the disclosure) 
is deemed filed under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and subject to 
section 18 of the Exchange Act, which attaches liability for any false or 
misleading statements. There has however been no enforcement action against 
 
85 Id. § 16A. 
86 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Congress,  
§ 1502 (2010) amends § 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Final Rule for the 
implementation of § 1502 was approved by the SEC in August 2012: SEC, 17 CFR 240 and 
249b, Conflict Minerals, Final Rule. For more detail of what is required, see Olga Ortega-
Martin, Human Rights Due Diligence for Corporations: From Voluntary Standards to Hard 
Law at Last?, 32 NETHERLANDS Q. OF HUM. RTS. 44, 64-65 (2014). 
87 U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Conflict Minerals, 
GAO-19-607 (2019). 
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companies for failure to comply with the Conflict Mineral Rule, 88 despite the 
mixed record of engagement and compliance among companies.89 
The European Union has also passed a disclosure law aimed at supply 
chain due diligence for the use of conflict minerals.90 This is company law, not 
securities law, laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union 
importers of tin, tantalum, and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from 
conflict-affected and high-risk areas. The Regulation will enter into force in 
2021. The geographical scope of the EU Regulation is broader than the Dodd-
Frank Act s. 1502, targeting imports not only from conflict zones and areas 
where a risk of armed confrontation exists but also from failed states and areas 
where widespread and systematic violations of international law, including 
human rights abuses, occur.91 Nationally, implementing the Regulation depends 
on the responsible authorities designated by Member States.92 These authorities 
should conduct ex-post checks on how Union importers comply with the 
Conflict Minerals Regulation.93 This includes audits of records as well as on-
the-spot inspections. 94  The Regulation has been criticized for its lack of 
sanctions.95  Member States set the rules that apply to infringements of the 
Regulation. When an infringement occurs, the competent authorities issue a 
notice of remedial action to be undertaken by the company. 96  Whether 
compliance will be achieved without penalties for failure to take remedial action 
remains to be seen. 
The only example of a targeted due diligence law is the Dutch Child 
Labor Due Diligence Act, which was approved by the Dutch Senate in 2019, 
 
88 In April 2017 the SEC released a statement indicating that the staff of the SEC would not 
recommend enforcement action if companies only file a Form SD, and not a Conflict Minerals 
Report, see SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Updated Statement on the Effect of the 
Court of Appeals Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule (Apr. 7, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/corpfin-updated-statement-court-decision-
conflict-minerals-rule. Companies are being encouraged to continue to file Conflict Minerals 
Reports, and many continue to do so. See Id.  
89Mining the Disclosures 2019: An Investor Guide to Conflict Minerals and Cobalt 
Reporting in Year Six, RESPONSIBLE SOURCING NETWORK (2020). 
90 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017, 
Laying Down Supply Chain Due Diligence Obligations for Union Importers of Tin, Tantalum 
and Tungsten, Their Ores, and Gold Originating from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, 
art. 6, 2017 O.J. (L 130). 
91 No definitive list of “conflict-affected” or “high-risk” countries has been published yet and 
Union importers are encouraged to make this assessment themselves based on non-binding 
guidelines issued by the European Commission. Commission Recommendation 2018/1149 of 
10 August 2018 on non-binding guidelines for the identification of conflict-affected and high-
risk areas and other supply chain risks under Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, 2018 O.J. (L 208) 94, 94. 
92 List of Member State competent authorities designated under Article 10(1) of Regulation 
(EU) 2017/821, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/april/tradoc_157843.pdf. 
93 Conflict Minerals Regulation, arts. 10-11. 
94 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, The EU Conflict Minerals Regulation - New due 
diligence requirements for importers, LEXOLOGY (June 5, 2020), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=767728d7-ad5e-46ad-8746-40bde6d921ee. 
95 John Williams, The battle for stronger EU conflict minerals legislation, GLOBAL MINING 
REVIEW (Feb. 4 2020, 11:25 AM), https://www.globalminingreview.com/finance-
business/04022020/the-battle-for-stronger-eu-conflict-minerals-legislation/. 
96 Conflict Minerals Regulation, art. 16. 
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and is yet to go into effect.97 Like the French law, the Act brings together the 
HRDD and transparency elements of the UNGPs’ second pillar by pushing 
companies to examine their supply chains for child labor, act upon their 
findings, and report that they have done so. Specifically, the Act requires all 
companies that supply goods or services to Dutch end-users to issue a 
declaration that due diligence is conducted to prevent child labor from being 
used in the production of goods and services. In order to make the requisite 
declaration, it is implicit that the company must conduct the necessary due 
diligence. Should the due diligence give the company a reasonable suspicion of 
child labor in the production of the company’s goods or services, it must adopt 
and implement a plan of action to address this.  
Once the obligation is in place, a new regulator [toezichthouder] will be 
created that will publish the corporate human rights due diligence statements in 
an online public registry.98 There will not be a formal list of companies that 
must comply with the law, however. Affected third parties such as victims 
cannot sue companies under the Act,99 but they can submit complaints that may 
trigger enforcement by the regulator. Any individual or entity wishing to submit 
a complaint must first submit the complaint to the company itself. If the 
company’s reaction is ‘inadequate’ according to the complainant, and on the 
basis of concrete evidence of non-compliance with the Act, a complaint can be 
filed with the regulator.100 A company can be fined up to €8,200 for failing to 
submit a statement declaring that it exercises due diligence.101 If a company 
fails to carry out due diligence in accordance with the Act or to draw up a plan 
of action, or to comply with any further requirements that are established 
pertaining to due diligence and the plan of action, a fine of up to €870,000 or 
10% of the worldwide annual turnover of the company can be imposed.102 Thus, 
in terms of regulatory oversight, the Act provides the most comprehensive 
oversight among the laws discussed. But the scheme still has gaps: in particular, 
the Dutch authorities will not actively enforce the law apart from when they do 
so in response to a third-party complaint, meaning that the law relies on the 
 
97 The expectation is that the Act will become effective sometime in 2022. The three-year 
period between the Act’s approval and it going into effect would give the government time to 
prepare a General Administrative Order that appoints the regulator and fleshes out the 
obligations of companies under the Act in more detail, see Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence 
Act Approved by Senate – Implications for Global Companies, ROPES & GRAY (June 5, 2019), 
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2019/06/Dutch-Child-Labor-Due-Diligence-
Act-Approved-by-Senate-Implications-for-Global-Companies. 
98 Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Act art. 3 (2019). See Anneloes Hoff, Dutch Child Labor 
Due Diligence Law: A Step Towards Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence, OXFORD 
HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (June 10, 2019), https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/dutch-child-labour-due-
diligence-law-a-step-towards-mandatory-human-rights-due-diligence. 
99Study on Due Diligence Requirements Through the Supply Chain, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
211 (2020). Plaintiffs under general Dutch tort law, nevertheless, would still be able to rely 
indirectly on the Act if the violation of the Act by the company could be construed as an 
indication of an act contrary to a duty of care to society. Where the compliance officer 
breaches their obligations, such as by a violation of the implementation of a due diligence 
process that causes serious bodily harm, the compliance officer themselves incur personal 
criminal liability. This can be punishment of a maximum of 2 years’ imprisonment and a 
€20,500 fine. 
100 Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Act art. 3 (2019). 
101 ROPES & GRAY, supra note 97. 
102 Id. 
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watchdog role of civil society to ensure its effectiveness.103 We discuss the 
problems with this approach in Part V. 
IV. Benefits of transparency and HRDD requirements to corporate 
accountability for human rights impacts 
 
Despite their shortcomings, which are discussed in later sections, the 
current transparency and HRDD requirements do move the legal framework 
closer towards bringing human rights standards to bear on corporate activities. 
The most obvious positive impact is that it places human rights on the corporate 
agenda at the highest levels of management for the covered businesses. 104 By 
placing an expectation on companies to think about at the board level and, 
ideally, engage in the issues external reporting and HRDD raise,105 this may 
influence internal business decisions that produce adverse human rights 
impacts.106  
Corporations may be prompted to monitor and change their own 
behavior, as well as to push for change in supplier practices. The different 
degrees of expectations placed on companies by different types of legislation 
will influence the extent of the positive change (if any) that may occur. Whereas 
a mandatory HRDD law such as the French Law on the Corporate Duty of 
Vigilance may achieve a greater commitment from the businesses covered and 
more substantial change on the ground for those adversely impacted, the a light 
touch disclosure law, such as the UK MSA is less likely to bring a substantial 
change for the workers and communities affected. 107 
Human rights disclosures may reveal information that stakeholders did 
not previously have access to, if as a minimum they cover description of policies 
and processes. In other words, reporting on human rights impacts can contribute 
to legal and non-legal accountability by providing shareholders and other 
stakeholders with formal acknowledgement by the company of its human rights 
risks, policies and processes.108 In terms of enhancing legal accountability, due 
diligence laws play a crucial role by expressly placing a legal duty on businesses 
to prevent, mitigate and remediate human rights impacts. These duties are 
 
103 Chiara Macchi & Claire Bright, Hardening Soft Law: The Implementation of Human 
Rights Due Diligence Requirements in Domestic Legislation, in LEGAL SOURCES IN BUSINESS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS - EVOLVING DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 12 (M. 
Buscemi, N. Lazzerini & L. Magi eds., 2020). 
104 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Submission to the Joint Human Rights Committee 
of the UK Houses of Parliament, ¶7.1 reported that in their consultations with businesses on the 
transparency in supply chains clause ‘businesses told [them] that the Modern Slavery Act had 




105 CHARLOTTE VILLIERS, CORPORATE REPORTING AND COMPANY LAW 51 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
106 Eccles & Serafeim, supra note 6, at 3. For a discussion of how social disclosure can 
catalyze internally driven changes in corporate behavior, see Park, supra note 43; See also, for 
an analysis of the shortcomings of the EU NFRD on affecting organizational change, 
Buhmann, supra note 9, at 36-39.      
107 CORE, supra note 81.  
108 Id. at 31. 
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backed up by various enforcement and liability measures. As for disclosures, 
information disclosed in human rights reports can be relied on as evidence in 
litigation brought against parent or lead companies by individuals harmed at 
subsidiary or supplier sites 109  or by consumers misled by the company’s 
disclosures. 110 Most recently, corporate sustainability reports have been relied 
on by the plaintiffs in Lungowe v Vedanta case in England and Jabir v KiK case 
in Germany to demonstrate the existence of a prima facie duty of care assumed 
by the parent or the lead company towards the communities or workers harmed 
by the subsidiary or supplier’s activities.111  
On the non-legal accountability side, the approach of a company to its 
human rights due diligence and reporting can inform stakeholder decisions in 
relation to the company - for example investment decisions; purchasing 
decisions of consumers and customers and employment decisions. 112  It is 
expected that the stakeholders informed by the human rights disclosures will 
put pressure on businesses to improve their policies and practices. The opinion 
of stakeholders matters because, it is claimed, the social legitimacy of business 
is monitored through the public-policy arena rather than the marketplace.’113 
External agencies such as international finance institutions or government 
agencies may scrutinize these reports if they require evidence that companies 
have identified and managed human rights risks as a condition of providing 
support to them. Such support could be the provision of export credit, the 
granting of a procurement contract or the loan of finance. 114  Civil society 
organizations have made use of the information in various ways that help the 
public and policy-makers see the shortcomings of the legislation but also 
highlight the contrasts between a company’s statements on human rights and its 
actual performance. The value of these developments should not be overstated, 
however. The next section discusses the inadequacies of the existing legal 
frameworks for improving corporate accountability for adverse human rights 
impacts.  
 
109 For more on this see, Rachel Chambers & Anil Yilmaz-Vastardis, The New EU Rules on 
Non-financial Reporting: Potential Impacts on Access to Remedy?, 1 HUM. RTS. & INT’L 
LEGAL DISCOURSE 18, 18-40 (2016). 
110 See infra p. 24 and note 152. 
111 See Dominic Liswaniso Lungowe and Others v. Vedanta Res. PLC. and Konkola Copper 
Mines PLC [2017] EWCA Civ 1528, [84]; Sheldon Leader, Jane Wright & Anil Yilmaz, 
Legal Opinion on English Common Law Principles on Tort - Jabir and Others v KiK Textilien 
Und Non-Food GmbH, (Dec. 7 2015), 
https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Juristische_Dokumente/Legal_Opion_Essex_Jabir_et_al_v_K
iK_2015.pdf. 
112 Choudhury, supra note 23, at 191; See UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework, 
supra note 33. 
113 Dennis Patten, Exposure, Legitimacy and Social Disclosure, 10 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 297 
(1991). 
114 Shift-Mazars, supra note 112; In the UK, the MSA and other relevant legislation do not 
require public procurement processes to consider company reports under MSA, § 54. It has 
been recommended by an independent review that the UK Government introduce standards to 
exclude non-compliant companies from eligibility for public contracts. Frank Field, Maria 
Miller & Baroness Butler-Sloss, Independent Review of the Modern Slavery Act, ¶ 2.6.4, 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KjrBFlqM1jLq4I-DFTy98t1VLZMsBapy/view. 
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V. Weaknesses and pitfalls of this mode of market-led 
accountability 
 
Our analysis of the existing disclosure and HRDD laws in Part III 
demonstrates that, despite the variation in the obligations imposed, they rely 
predominantly or exclusively on the ‘market’ to exercise checks and hold 
businesses accountable for human rights impacts.115 This is not unusual since, 
at least for corporate disclosures, the main objective is to empower market 
actors with information. But when the disclosure rules themselves are not 
designed robustly, the empowerment and accountability functions are hindered 
by businesses’ lack of disclosure, inadequate disclosures and misleading 
disclosures.  While HRDD laws represent a crucial step for improving corporate 
accountability by imposing substantive obligations on businesses to identify, 
prevent, mitigate, and remediate human rights impacts and communicate these 
steps, they still heavily rely on initiatives from stakeholders for oversight and 
enforcement. Communication of the HRDD processes and outcomes to 
stakeholders via corporate disclosures is a key tool for those stakeholders to 
understand and react to the human rights performance of businesses. To 
effectively and meaningfully exercise this role, stakeholders need the support 
of regulatory tools to ensure completeness and accuracy of HRDD disclosures. 
Studies have shown that disclosure laws have had very limited success 
in improving human rights conditions for affected groups and improving 
accountability for impacts.116 This is unsurprising if these laws fail to elevate 
human rights and environmental impact considerations on the priorities list of 
the corporate world driven primarily by increasing profits.117 We argue here that 
to improve the accountability function of HRDD and reporting obligations, two 
main weaknesses in the current rules need to be overcome. The first one relates 
to the content of the reports and the information that should be or is disclosed 
under the relevant legislation. According to benchmarking reports analyzing 
these disclosures, 118  the content of the reports remains largely limited to 
disclosure of information on commitments and policies rather than disclosing 
concrete risks to workers and communities and substantive steps taken to 
address them. This is particularly problematic where the reporting requirements 
are not accompanied with a due diligence obligation. We join scholars who have 
argued that the lack of a due diligence obligation preceding the disclosure places 
serious limitations on the law’s promise to increase corporate accountability and 
 
115 See, e.g., Theresa May, Modern Slavery and Supply Chains Consultation 
Consultation, HOME OFFICE  1, 8 (2015) (“We believe that once it is made clear what activity 
major businesses are undertaking to ensure slavery and human trafficking is not taking place 
in their supply chains or own business, pressure from consumers, shareholders and 
campaigners and competition between businesses will encourage those who have not taken 
effective steps to do so.” And also, at 13, “Instead of relying on heavy-handed regulation, this 
measure will encourage businesses to do the right thing, by harnessing consumer and other 
stakeholder pressure, which will encourage and influence businesses to do more”). 
116 See Rao & Bernaz, supra note 35; Seeing Through Transparency: Making Corporate 
Accountability Work for Workers, FLEX (July 2018), 
https://www.labourexploitation.org/publications/seeing-through-transparency-making-
corporate-accountability-work-workers. 
117 Bartley, supra note 11, at 49; Bartley, supra note 11, at n.56. 
118 See, e.g., Michelle Langlois, Human Rights Reporting: Are Companies Telling Investors 
What They Need to Know?, SHIFT (May 2017),  https://shiftproject.org/resource/human-rights-
reporting-are-companies-telling-investors-what-they-need-to-know/. 
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contribute to eradicating human rights abuses.119 Most disclosures have been 
largely limited to descriptions of the company’s commitments and processes in 
addressing human rights and modern slavery issues in their supply chains.120 
Little space, if any, is dedicated to issues of substance such as the specific risks 
to employees and communities identified within the company’s own business 
and its supply chain, and references to the concrete steps they have taken to 
eliminate those risks and remediate the grievances.121 More advanced reports 
typically present the company’s declared approach/commitment to tackling 
modern slavery or human rights issues, expectations from its suppliers, links to 
a list of suppliers (first tier),122 most salient risks identified, and the plans, 
policies, programs and procedures it has established to assess and address the 
risks, and finally may include some case studies.123 The pattern of focus on 
procedures and policies resembles the audit and certification processes that are 
widely employed by lead firms to regulate labor, human rights and 
environmental performance in their supply chains and which typically focus on 
the process rather than substance.124 Since audits and certification processes 
have so far been the central tool used to deal with human rights impacts in 
supply chains, it is unsurprising that most disclosures are limited to process as 
well.  
The content of human rights disclosures can be strengthened if they 
accompany a human rights due diligence obligation. As the HRDD framework 
proposed by the UNGPs clarifies that the process should focus on the risks to 
the rights holders rather than focusing on the risks to the business itself, the 
focus of the reports attached to the HRDD processes should contain rights 
holder oriented communication. But as we discuss in the following parts of this 
article, an HRDD obligation alone may not enhance the usefulness of 
disclosures in terms of accountability. The analyses of the initial disclosures 
 
119 Justine Nolan & Gregory Bott, Global Supply Chains and Human Rights: Spotlight on 
Forced Labor and Modern Slavery Practices, 24 AUSTRALIAN J. HUM. RTS. 44, 56 (2018). See 
also Nolan, supra note 3; Genevieve LeBaron, The Global Business of Forced Labor: 
Recommendations to UK Policymakers, ECONOMIC & SOCIAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 1, 4-5 
(2018). 
120 An Ergon Associates study found that ‘most statements do not go further than general 
commitments and broad indications of processes. Reporting on Modern Slavery: The Current 
State of Disclosure, ERGON (2016). See also Modern slavery reporting: Is there evidence of 
progress?, ERGON (2018); LeBaron and Ruhmkorf’s study shows that companies reporting on 
bribery under the UK Bribery Act are using a much more firm and clear language, while 
modern slavery reporting uses a weaker and aspirational language, LeBaron & Ruhmkorf, 
supra note 3, at 25; SHIFT, supra note 118; CORE COALITION, supra note 3, at 6. 
1212018 Research Report: The state of Corporate Sustainability Disclosure under the EU Non-




122 Since rights abuses are most severe in further tiers of a brand’s supply chain, including the 
informal subcontracting arrangements, unless modern slavery reports pay particular attention 
to disclosing the company’s practices on the treatment of the most vulnerable workers in the 
supply chain, they will be of little value. See also FLEX, supra note 109, at 30-31. 
123 See, e.g., Modern Slavery Statement 2017/18, MARKS & SPENCER (May 2018), 
https://corporate.marksandspencer.com/documents/plan-a-our-approach/mns-modern-slavery-
statement-june2018.pdf. 
124 Bartley, supra note 11, at 55. For discussion of the duty of care of social auditors, see Tara 
Van Ho & Carolijn Terwindt, Assessing the Duty of Care for Social Auditors, 27 EUR. REV. 
PRIV. L. 379, 379 – 401 (2019).  
Regulatory Oversight of Human Rights Disclosure and Due Diligence Laws 
 
21 
under the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance law demonstrate that 
despite the improvements in disclosures, reporting ‘remains relatively 
immature’. 125  For those companies that have complied with the reporting 
requirement, disclosures on policies and processes remains the key message. 
The implementation of s.1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act also suggests that even 
with a due diligence requirement, more is needed to make these laws effective 
in achieving their aims.126 Many HRDD disclosures focus on commitments and 
processes in the abstract and this fails to provide the kind of meaningful 
information that stakeholders may rely on in making investment, purchasing, 
and campaigning decisions about that company. This type of disclosure can also 
easily transform into a publicity tool painting a misleading picture of a 
company’s human rights performance. More dangerously, it can mask and 
legitimate serious abuses, especially where they report successes based on 
audits and certification.127   
This takes us to the second weakness in these laws, which is our focus 
in the rest of this article. The lack or inadequacy of mechanisms for formal 
oversight and enforcement render the role of the stakeholders, as guardians of 
accountability, extremely challenging and thus undermine the accountability 
objectives of these laws. It is hoped that the market forces alone will assume the 
oversight function and produce the desired accountability outcomes without 
having the support of appropriate regulatory tools in exercising this function. 
We argue here that even if the first weakness is overcome, as it has been in the 
French law, without a formal verification, oversight, and enforcement process 
the utility of the disclosures to empower stakeholders to pressure for change 
will be undermined due to: (1) the reliability of the information disclosed 
remaining questionable, (2) stakeholders being left to search for a needle in a 
haystack in the absence of formal lists of covered businesses and central public 
repositories for reports, and (3) even where the inadequacy and the accuracy of 
disclosures are well established, lack of enforcement measures and sanctions 
that can be triggered by stakeholders will weaken their leverage. The flaws on 
content and oversight are closely linked and for mandated disclosure to 
contribute meaningfully to corporate accountability for adverse human rights 
impacts, both must be addressed by the policy and law makers. In the remaining 
parts of this article, we engage in an in-depth discussion of oversight and 
enforcement issues. 
A. Market oversight 
 
Even when companies do fulfil their obligation to report on issues of 
human rights and modern slavery, doubts remain as to the effectiveness of these 
 
125 Human Rights Reporting in France: A Baseline for Assessing the Impact of the Duty of 
Vigilance Law, SHIFT 2018, https://humanrights.wbcsd.org/project/human-rights-reporting-in-
france-a-baseline-for-assessing-the-impact-of-the-duty-of-vigilance-law/. 
126 Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining a Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L. J. 419, 431 
(2015). In this study Sarfaty finds that only about 7% of companies report strong due 
diligence measures in their 2014 reports prepared in order to comply with the regulation. 
127 Genevieve LeBaron & Jane Lister, Benchmarking Global Supply Chains: The Power of the 
‘Ethical Audit’ Regime, 41 REV. INT’L STUD. 905 (2015); LeBaron, supra note 112, at 3 
uncovered that “certification had little to no impact on labor standards within the tea industry 
… [and] [s]ome of the worst cases of exploitation documented within [their] research 
occurred on ethically certified plantations.” 
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reports from an accountability point of view. Early empirical research indicates 
that, the legally mandated human rights and modern slavery disclosures are 
“quite limited”, 128  “more symbolic than substantive” 129  and that some 
companies even appear to copy each other’s explanations of their due diligence 
processes.130 These practices of failing to comply or selective reporting have 
reportedly been unwelcome by certain businesses that want to see serious 
monitoring and enforcement so as to level the playing field. 131 The Ethical 
Trading Initiative (ETI), in a submission to the UK Houses of Parliament Public 
Accounts Committee, reported that a large majority of companies they have 
engaged with stated that: “it is important for the Government to monitor 
compliance with section 54 of the [Modern Slavery] Act and […] the Act could 
not be effective without this.”132 
We saw in Part III above that the reporting and HRDD laws analyzed in 
this article take varying approaches to the regulation of oversight and 
enforcement. The common rationale behind each law is to empower key 
stakeholders, such as investors, consumers, and civil society, with information 
that will enable them to bring human rights standards to bear on corporate 
misconduct. In this respect, these stakeholders can play a crucial role of 
oversight and enforcement by making effective use of the information disclosed 
through these reports. In other words, the stakeholders will take notice of 
businesses that fail to report or reports inadequately, and penalize them by not 
purchasing products, divesting or not investing, or by running campaigns to 
raise awareness about the businesses failure.133 These market interventions can, 
in their most legalized form, include consumer suits for misleading disclosures 
or advertising. The thinking is that these market pressures will result in 
companies improving their practices/processes on human rights and modern 
slavery risks in their supply chains.  
There are a few overly optimistic assumptions here and this approach 
has been challenged already from several angles, particularly with respect to the 
scale of the desired transformative impact of human rights reports on consumer 
 
128 Rachel N. Birkey et al., Mandated Social Disclosure: An Analysis of the Response to the 
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, 152 J. BUS. ETHICS 827, 837 (2018). 
129 Id. 
130 Steve Gibbons, What are construction and building companies reporting under the Modern 
Slavery Act?, LINKEDIN (Feb. 22 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/what-construction-
building-companies-reporting-under-modern-gibbons. See also Hess, supra note 43, at 53, 
which examines human rights reporting and concludes that reports are “unbalanced, 
incomprehensive, and inconsistent’ and that reporting under CTSA and MSA ‘face[s] similar 
challenges.” 
131 FLEX, supra note 122, at 20-22, “One FLEX interview participant who is in favor of 
stronger enforcement of the Act, said that he was concerned that penalties in isolation could 
result in transparency reporting being a tick box exercise for many companies. He suggested 
that a penalty for non-compliance should only be introduced in combination with expectations 
or requirements on the content of statements as many statements otherwise are unlikely to 
provide meaningful information.” 
132 Written evidence to the UK Houses of Parliament Public Accounts Committee, ETHICAL 
TRADING INITIATIVE (2018), 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/public-
accounts-committee/reducing-modern-slavery/written/78586.htm. 
133 Responding to Modern Slavery – New UK Benchmarking Report, supra note 26.  
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behavior.134 Narine argues that company human rights disclosures, including on 
modern slavery, are not always widely disseminated or known about and that 
stakeholders who do know about them do not use the information they contain 
adequately to press for corporate reform. 135 She concludes that evidence of 
consumer behavior changing as a result of such disclosure is ‘at best 
inconsistent’. 136  Narine’s reasoning would also apply to HRDD related 
disclosures. Her viewpoint chimes with a study of human rights disclosure 
conducted by Chilton and Sarfaty, which found that consumers perceived non-
compliant or inadequate supply chain disclosures in the same way as they did 
detailed disclosures showing a high level of due diligence. 137  Their study 
suggests that “supply chain disclosures are unlikely to be understood and used 
by consumers making purchasing decisions.”138  
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the impact HRDD and 
disclosure will have on the transformation of corporate behavior if they heavily 
or solely rely on a market-based enforcement model. Consumer and investor 
perceptions might change the longer these rules are in force, or as the ability of 
civil society organizations to raise public awareness of HRDD and reports 
increases, thus elevating their impact.139 But we put forward two arguments 
why this will not overcome the limitations of the impact HRDD and disclosure 
laws can have on improving business behavior. First, the passage of time alone 
will not overcome the weaknesses relating to the content of the reports discussed 
in the previous section. Second, as we argue in this article, improving content 
requirements alone will also not suffice to achieve the optimal accountability 
and transformation objectives envisaged by these disclosure laws. Chilton and 
Sarfaty identify the limitations of reliance on consumers as influencers in this 
area. They note that corporate disclosures are generally not sufficiently 
effective, but that they are less likely to produce meaningful outcomes in this 
particular area. This is because the information communicated to the consumer 
relates to processes used in the making of the product and not to its 
characteristics. They argue that consumers might not be willing to change their 
purchasing decisions based merely on process if all other qualities of the product 
are the same.140 Their reasoning here would also apply to HRDD disclosures. 
The other obstacle they observe is the difficulty in interpreting the contents of 
the disclosure. For instance, MSA reports merely present the processes a 
company is using to try to tackle modern slavery in their supply chain, but do 
not report the incidences of modern slavery and how the company responded to 
it. Also, companies will face different risks depending on variables like sector, 
 
134 Marcia Narine, Disclosing Disclosure’s Defects: Addressing Corporate Irresponsibility for 
Human Rights Impacts, 47 COLUM HUM. RTS. L. REV. 33 (2015); Chilton & Sarfaty, supra 
note 12. 
135 Narine, supra note 134. 
136 Id. at 48. 
137 Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 12, at 6. 
138 Id. They do note that the study had several limitations, like the fact that these reporting 
requirements are new.  
139 Narine, supra note 134, at 40. 
140 Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 12, at 23; FLEX, supra note 122, at 20-21 reports that ‘one 
company representative [interviewed] suggested the idea that consumers are going to 
challenge companies for failure to comply with the Act or for publishing statements of poor 
quality is flawed, saying “we’re so far away from this being the reality.”’ 
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business model, or location of sourcing. It is very unlikely that consumers will 
be able to interpret the contribution of these factors to eradicate modern slavery.  
 Another important reality to note is that even where awareness is high 
and there is a sustained reaction against a business because of its performance 
in this area, this can only cover businesses/brands that are consumer facing.141 
This leaves many large businesses that operate in industries like mining, 
construction, shipping, or defense outside one of the main radars of the 
transparency legislation. These businesses may still be under the civil society 
organization or investor radar, but it needs to be recognized that it may be harder 
for CSOs to garner public interest to a campaign against a non-consumer facing 
company and some investors might place less importance on reputational risk 
posed to a business that is non-consumer facing.  
 In view of these hurdles for consumers, it is more likely that the greatest 
pressure on businesses to improve their human rights performance will come 
from CSOs and investors than consumers. Interested CSOs and investors 
scrutinize human rights and modern slavery disclosures actively. 142  CSOs 
publish their analyses of these reports, highlighting the levels of compliance as 
well as the weak and notable practices.143 They also invite companies to respond 
to allegations against them of human rights abuses in their supply chains, 
informally or as part of a process established in law, such as the process 
available under the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance.144 The 
information contained (or the lack of information) in a human rights or modern 
slavery statement can bring the spotlight on the policies and performance of the 
reporting companies. Similarly, investors can raise concerns and questions with 
businesses they are investing in during annual meetings or directly with 
management.145 They might take into consideration the human rights record of 
a business or its efforts to eliminate modern slavery in its supply chain when 
making their investment or divestment decisions. 146  Both groups of 
stakeholders can also engage with policy-makers to increase efforts to eliminate 
modern slavery, if they find the legislative framework inadequate.  
The amount, accuracy, and type of information presented in the reports 
or, in many cases, the lack of reporting, place a substantial limit on the 
 
141 Written evidence to the UK Houses of Parliament Public Accounts Committee, supra note 
132. 
142 In fact, it has been observed that “due to insufficient regulation, a large burden lies with the 
international civil society which, in various ways, monitors the functionality of transnational 
corporations.” Jernej Letnar Černič, Moving Towards Protecting Human Rights in Global 
Business Supply Chains, 36 B.U. INT’L L. J. 101, 109 (2018); see also, INVESTOR ALLIANCE 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, https://investorsforhumanrights.org (last visited July 31, 2020). 
143 See, e.g., Modern Slavery Reporting: Weak and Notable Practice, CORE COALITION (June 
2017), http://www.respect.international/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Modern-Slavery-
Reporting-Weak-and-Notable-Practice-CORE-2017.pdf; CORE COALITION, supra note 3. 
144 See supra notes 56-58, NGOs make allegations to the company in the first instance, and 
may elevate their concerns to the court if the company does not respond adequately. 
145 Engaging with Companies on Modern Slavery: A Briefing for Investors, CORE COALITION 
1, 9 (June 2017), https://corporate-responsibility.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Core_InvestorBriefingFINAL-1.pdf. 
146 For instance, investment fund Blackrock divested from Nevsun Resources Ltd because of 
the allegations that the latter uses forced labor in its Eritrean mining operations, after 
receiving pressure from NGOs. See BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTER, 
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/campaigners-welcome-blackrock’s-divestment-
from-nevsun-following-campaign-over-alleged-use-of-forced-labour-in-eritrea-nevsun-denies-
use-of-forced-labour#c17272 (last visited June 1 2020).  
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contribution of investors/CSOs to improving corporate accountability in this 
area. 147  Businesses are required to disclose very little to comply with the 
reporting requirements, and under some of the laws this includes the option of 
disclosing lack of action in this area. The disclosures, even the most detailed 
ones available, mainly focus on process and contain little information on 
concrete problems. It is difficult for an investor or an CSO to extract actionable 
information from these disclosures on a company’s actual human rights 
performance. These factors significantly limit these stakeholders’ ability to use 
the disclosures to hold businesses accountable for human rights violations in 
their supply chains. With only a very small number of CSOs monitoring the 
legislation,148 it is unreasonable for policy-makers to expect civil society actors 
with limited resources to drive the push towards business compliance with the 
transparency laws without any serious regulatory support.   
One of the only means of private legal action challenging the accuracy 
of human rights disclosure is consumer litigation. When activist consumers sue 
companies, this has the potential to send a powerful message.149 The cause of 
action could be a suit under consumer protection law or other statutory 
prohibition on misrepresentation, unfair competition or false advertising, 
challenging the accuracy or adequacy of the disclosure and arguing that 
consumers were ill-informed or misled when purchasing products, causing them 
harm. 150 The disclosure that is challenged through this litigation has in some 
instances been made pursuant to one of the laws discussed in this article, but 
many of these cases concern product information from labels or other product 
literature.151  On the whole, the impact of these lawsuits has been quite limited 
so far. A series of cases brought against companies in California alleging 
inadequate and/or misleading disclosure of documented modern slavery in their 
supply chains were rejected by the courts.152 There is a concern that even if 
 
147 See supra note 120. 
148 Written evidence to the UK Houses of Parliament Public Accounts Committee, supra note 
132. 
149 Ryan J. Turner, Transnational Supply Chain Regulation: Extraterritorial Regulation as 
Corporate Law's New Frontier, 17 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 188, 197 (2016). 
150 For a full list of cases, see infra p. 24 and note 152. There have been similar cases outside 
the United States. In Germany, a successful complaint was filed against German retailer Lidl 
in 2010 for false advertising and unfair competition arising from the retailer’s claims of fair 
working conditions in its supply chain. Following the complaint, Lidl agreed to retract the 
claims made in its marketing material on working conditions in its supply chain. Although this 
was a successful outcome of the litigation, and it had an impact on the company’s public 
statements on these issues, it is not possible to determine whether it had any substantive 
impact on the company’s sourcing policies or practices: see Complaint re Fair Working 
Conditions in Bangladesh: Lidl Forced to Back Down, ECCHR, 
https://www.ecchr.eu/en/case/complaint-re-fair-working-conditions-in-bangladesh-lidl-forced-
to-back-down/. This complaint did not relate to disclosure made under modern slavery 
legislation but rather to statements on its supply chain that the company made voluntarily. 
151 One of the early cases in this line, Marc Kasky v. Nike, Inc., et al., 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002), 
concerned representations that Nike had made about working conditions in its supply chain.  
A settlement was agreed for $1.5 million and involved investments by Nike to strengthen 
workplace monitoring and factory worker programs. 
152 See Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5524 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016) (this case was dismissed for lack of standing); Barber v. Nestle, 154 
F. Supp. 3d 954 (2015) (the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ false advertising and unfair 
competition claims on the grounds that the CTSCA creates a safe harbor from liability by 
defining what a company is required to disclose regarding the use of forced labor in its supply 
chain. It also dismissed the misrepresentation claim, finding that the statements about supplier 
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these cases were successful, companies would make changes to their labels and 
product literature, rather than seek to improve conditions for workers in their 
supply chains. Damages are complicated to calculate in this type of case, 
because it is hard to value the loss to the plaintiffs, when the harm they have 
suffered is that they would not have bought the products if they knew about the 
use of child and forced labor in the supply chain. The lack of success in claims 
to date has not prevented new cases being brought, however.153 Thus, consumer 
litigation has the potential to provide enforcement of reporting accuracy and 
adequacy but in an ancillary role to other types of enforcement. 
VI. The importance of regulatory oversight and the institutional 
options 
 
We argue in this article that to achieve their stated accountability goals, 
human rights due diligence and disclosure requirements should be accompanied 
by rules establishing: (1) a formal list of businesses covered by the requirements 
(2) a publicly accessible repository for storing annual disclosures (3) the type 
of human rights information to be disclosed and (4) an institutional structure to 
exercise oversight and enforcement functions and provide training and 
guidelines to ensure accuracy and completeness of disclosures. Without these 
features accompanying the disclosure requirements, stakeholders’ ability to 
make effective use of the information disclosed becomes significantly 
diminished.154 The presence of an oversight body with the powers to check 
accuracy and completeness and impose sanctions for misleading and incomplete 
disclosures will allow the stakeholders targeted by the transparency rules to 
exercise their leverage more systematically and effectively. Admittedly, it may 
be a huge task for a regulatory body to scrutinize all reports submitted, 
especially as the number of covered companies grow, but the body could 
routinely review a random sample each financial year and be prompted by 
investors, consumers, and civil society to carry out additional reviews or 
investigations. Stakeholders should have standing to initiate complaints 
regarding suspected discrepancies and inaccuracies in reports to an expert body, 
 
adherence to law and industry standards were ‘aspirational’); Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 
857 (9th Cir. 2018) (the court, dismissing the case, found that Mars does not have a duty to 
disclose forced labor in its supply chain because it is not a physical defect that affects the 
central function of the chocolate products). See also Tomasella v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 364 F. 
Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2019); Tomasella v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 962 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2020); 
Tomasella v. Hershey Co., No. 18-cv-10360-ADB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14488 (D. Mass. 
Jan. 30, 2019) (a federal judge dismissed the lawsuit because the consumers' claims were not 
actionable under Massachusetts law and they failed to show that the companies deceived 
them). 
153 Walker v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-723-L-BGS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106858 
(S.D. Cal. June 16, 2020) and Myers v. Starbucks Corp., (5:20-cv-00335) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19 
2020). Both cases allege affirmative misrepresentation by the defendant companies in relation 
to statements made on product labels and literature that cocoa is “sustainably sourced” 
“certified” and “supports” or “helps” farmers. They rely on allegations of child and forced 
labor in the cocoa farms, and environmental destruction as part of clearing the land for farms, 
to evidence that these statements are misrepresentations.  
154 We are not alone in reaching this conclusion. Doorey, for instance, in an article on using 
domestic disclosure to influence foreign labor practices, argues that the information needs to 
be verified by the state (and/or a credible outside auditor). Doorey, supra note 25. 
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equipped with legal authority and sufficient resources, which can investigate 
the accuracy or adequacy of the information, if needed compel the business to 
correct and complement the disclosure, and impose penalties for failure to 
comply. In this approach, the stakeholders continue to play a key role for 
holding businesses accountable, equipped with and empowered by the 
regulatory tools and the institutional infrastructure to exercise their watchdog 
role more effectively. This way, the role of oversight is not entirely or largely 
left to the voluntary efforts of investors and CSOs whose abilities to push for 
compliance can be limited by several factors such as scarce financial and human 
resources, lack of authority to compel further disclosures, inability to impose 
financial penalties. At the same time, the oversight role would not be left 
exclusively to the regulatory authorities, as the stakeholders would continue to 
play a crucial role in the accountability framework from a strengthened position 
by having access to a centralized list and a repository and most importantly by 
having standing to bring complaints before a body with powers to investigate 
and impose penalties.    
A. Key functions of meaningful regulatory oversight 
 
Among the HRDD and transparency laws discussed in this article, the 
regulatory oversight feature remains either inadequate or non-existent. Even the 
French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance, with its advanced 
accountability features providing legal standing for civil society before courts 
to bring actions to enforce the duty to publish an adequate Vigilance Plan, lacks 
a regulatory body to exercise oversight over the law’s implementation and to 
hold a central list and repository thus leaving the challenging and resource 
intensive monitoring function almost exclusively to stakeholders. Taking stock 
from the initial experiences with the transparency laws discussed in the earlier 
parts of this article and most recently with the French Law on Duty of Vigilance, 
we argue that all of the elements elaborated below are needed to achieve greater 
level of accountability via transparency and HRDD laws. 
1. List and repository  
 
Civil society organizations have expressed concern about the lack of 
information on which companies are covered by various HRDD and reporting 
laws currently in force.155 It is often left to their investigative skills to identify 
which companies may be covered by disclosure requirements and confirm 
whether covered companies have published disclosures. Having an annually 
updated formal list of companies covered by human rights disclosure 
requirements provides the stakeholders and the regulator with an essential tool 
for identifying which companies have or have not complied with the most basic 
obligation under these laws. A central repository accessible by the public to 
store annual disclosures will allow stakeholders more efficient access both to 
the most recent reports and all the other years since the introduction of the 
relevant laws. 
As discussed in Part III, some disclosure laws already provide for a list 
and/or a repository, for instance the Australian MSA. For the disclosure laws 
which fail to provide for the establishment of a formal list and a central 
 
155 See, e.g., Savourey, supra note 57. 
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repository for reports, there have been calls for governments to introduce these 
(e.g. the UK MSA) to improve the effectiveness of these laws.156 In agreement 
with these calls, we argue that the establishment of a formal list and a repository 
to be an essential ingredient for improving the accountability mission of HRDD 
and disclosure laws. 
2. Monitoring function and the content of reports:  
 
The added value brought by having a regulator with monitoring 
responsibility is in ensuring submissions are made, that this occurs in a timely 
fashion, and exercising checks on the content of an appropriate size sample each 
year (coverage of all required elements in the reports, ensure accuracy). As we 
discussed above in Part V, the existing HRDD and disclosure laws rely 
primarily on stakeholders to monitor business performance and compliance 
with the applicable law’s requirements. Even the most evolved statutory regime, 
the French Law on Corporate Duty of Vigilance, does not establish regulatory 
oversight and relies on stakeholders to monitor whether covered businesses 
have developed and published an adequate vigilance plan. The enforcement and 
sanctions mechanisms of the French law (discussed in Part III) depend solely 
on the stakeholders identifying the lack of compliance with the law or the 
misleading statements within published plans and triggering the relevant court 
processes stipulated in the law. We will return to the subject of stakeholders 
raising complaints as a trigger for regulator action below, but first we address 
the primary source of monitoring currently in place in this legislative field, 
which is the monitoring of non-financial disclosure. 157  Non-financial 
disclosure, as the complement to financial disclosure, is usually monitored by 
auditors in the first instance, with financial regulators holding a further 
oversight function. The level of monitoring provided by the financial regulator 
varies from state to state. 
In some countries, limited oversight of human rights disclosures is 
exercised by accounting or securities regulators such as the Financial Reporting 
Council (United Kingdom) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(United States). For instance, the SEC enforces liability for any false or 
misleading statements under Dodd Frank s. 1502. The current US 
administration is not in favor of section 1502 and made a proposal to repeal it.158 
Verification and enforcement were stepped down.159 Whether coincidentally or 
as a result of these developments, there is very little verification and 
enforcement of this law that occurred in practice. The appropriateness of the 
SEC as a regulator on corporate social impacts is debated. The current civil 
society effort in the United States to push for a new corporate transparency law 
on social and environmental impacts is focused on publicly listed companies – 
its media briefing arguing “the SEC is the right agency, given its expertise in 
 
156 Independent Review of the Modern Slavery Act 2015: Final Report, supra note 82. 
157 The other potential source of monitoring under existing legal regimes is the US securities 
regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission. In theory at least, the SEC enforces 
liability for any false or misleading statements under Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.S. § 1502.  
158 Ed Pilkington, Proposed Trump executive order would allow US firms to sell 'conflict 
minerals', THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/feb/08/trump-administration-order-conflict-mineral-regulations.  
159 Supra note 88. 
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corporate disclosures, and broad mandate to protect investors and the public 
interest.”160 On the other hand, the ability of the SEC to be a ‘humanitarian 
watchdog’ has been questioned, due to the organization’s lack of specialist 
knowledge.161 
The EU Non-financial Disclosure Directive, which been transposed into 
the law of EU member states, provides a sample of instances on the monitoring 
of human rights disclosures. Eight states require that disclosure under the 
Directive forms part of the company’s management report.162 The allocation of 
the human rights report within the management report allows for a basic level 
of auditor scrutiny over the content of the report, as the EU Accounting 
Directive requires that the entire management report shall be checked by an 
auditor to verify consistency with the financial statements, compliance with 
legal requirements, and to check for the presence of material misstatements.163  
For a verification of a human rights report, there is not much to be gained 
by consistency checks with financial statements. Compliance with legal 
requirements is also easily verifiable as the legal requirements for human rights 
reporting are minimal and relatively vague. Only the checks for material 
misstatements could prove useful in the human rights reporting context, but 
such checks will require expertise and access to information that may exist 
within the company as well as beyond the company, and often beyond the 
country. Four states require verification of information beyond checks for 
consistency with the management report. 164  In Denmark, for instance, the 
implementing legislation envisages a regulatory review of 10-20% of listed 
companies which are selected for full scope enforcement each year, checking 
presence and content of statement.165 The enforcement approach is based on 
materiality of the disclosed information. Material misstatements may result in 
the imposition of fines in accordance with the Danish Financial Statements Act. 
The experience with the human rights transparency laws up to date 
shows that the unique features of human rights reporting call for a sui generis 
approach to oversight and enforcement. As with financial reporting, the rules 
on the required information and the oversight and enforcement relating to the 
completeness and accuracy of the content disclosed may be designed around the 
concept of ‘materiality’, but the meaning of ‘materiality’ in a human rights 
 
160 Corporate Human Rights Risk Assessment, Prevention, and Mitigation Act of 2019, 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE (June 10, 2019). On the SEC as 
a regulatory of human rights issues, see Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities 
Regulation, 54 VIRGINIA J. INT'L L. 97 (2013). 
161 Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and 
Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1325 (2012). 
162 Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, UK and Iceland: Global 
Reporting Initiative, supra note 48.  
163 Directive 2013/34/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
the Annual Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and Related Reports of 
Certain Types of Undertakings, Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and Repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, 2013 O.J. 
(L 182) 19 (according to its Article 53, the Member States will have to implement the 
new directive by July 20, 2015). 
164 Denmark, France, Italy and the Netherlands: Global Reporting Initiative, supra note 48. 
165 Act amending the Danish Financial Statements Act L 117. Global Reporting Initiative, 
supra note 48, at 19. 
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context is unclear in the existing reporting regulations.166 Materiality has been 
viewed as a misleading concept in the human rights context and instead the use 
of ‘salient risks’ has been proposed by the UNGP Reporting Framework.167 
Companies are typically required to disclose material information in non-
financial reports including in human rights disclosures. The EU Accounting 
Directive for instance describes material information as “the status of 
information where its omission or misstatement could reasonably be expected 
to influence decisions that users make on the basis of the financial statements 
of the undertaking. The materiality of individual items shall be assessed in the 
context of other similar items”.168 For non-financial statements, the EU NFD 
adds that the required disclosures shall contain information ‘to the extent 
necessary for an understanding of the […] impact of (the company's) 
activity’.169 The NFD recognizes that in determining materiality, the context in 
which the business is operating needs to be taken into account. Recital 8 of the 
Directive states that the information disclosed should cover “principal risks of 
severe impacts” which will be assessed by the scale and gravity of impact. One 
study points out that this introduces a different approach to materiality by 
focusing on the “scale and gravity of the materialization of the risk, rather than 
whether knowledge of a principal risk would influence readers’ economic 
decisions”.170 The approach fleshed out in the Recital 8 does align with the 
conception of ‘salient risk’ embedded in the pillar two of the UNGPs.171  
In a shift away from the usual investor-risk rationale for non-financial 
reporting, UNGP pillar two focuses on risks to rights-holders, and the 
importance of taking into account the perspectives of those who may be directly 
affected by companies’ actions. One study notes that this aspect of the 
‘materiality’ concept has not been reflected in the Member State implementing 
legislation covered in the study, however.172 A guidance published by the UK’s 
Financial Reporting Council on the non-financial reporting, for instance, 
emphasizes materiality for investors, thus following the classic shareholder-
centric understanding of materiality in the reporting context.173 But such an 
understanding of materiality for human rights reports does not align with the 
understanding of risk under the UNGPs which are centered around the affected 
individuals and communities. We argue here that human rights disclosure laws 
should impose mandatory minimum content for human rights disclosures 
covering salient human rights risks posed to individuals and communities 
 
166 Note the difference here between due diligence and reporting obligations. The due 
diligence laws are not framed in terms of materiality but, for instance, the French Law 
requires companies to detect risks and prevent serious violations with respect to human rights 
(the threshold is ‘serious’). 
167 See UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework, supra note 33. 
168 See Directive 2013/34/EU, supra note 159, at art. 2(16). 
169 Directive 2014/95/EU, supra note 44, at art. 1(1). 
170 Claire Jeffrey, Comparing the Implementation of the EU Non-Financial Reporting 
Directive in the UK, Germany, France, and Italy, FRANK BOLD 1, 5 (2017), 
http://www.purposeofcorporation.org/comparing-the-eu-non-financial-reporting-directive.pdf  
171 Salient risk is explained in the UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework, supra note 
167. 
172 Jeffrey, supra note 170. 
173Guidance on the Strategic Report, FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL (July 2018), 
https://www.frc.org.uk/accountants/accounting-and-reporting-policy/clear-and-concise-and-
wider-corporate-reporting/narrative-reporting/guidance-on-the-strategic-report. 
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affected by the activity of the business and the steps taken to prevent, mitigate, 
and remediate impacts.174  
In assessing the completeness of human rights disclosures, auditors and 
regulatory bodies will have to determine which human rights issues relating to 
a company’s business can be categorized as salient. The size and geographical 
spread of a covered company’s business is likely to render checking the 
completeness of the disclosure challenging due to external information covering 
each overseas or domestic subsidiary or supplier’s human rights impact not 
being readily available to the external auditors and the regulatory bodies.175 The 
distinction between this type of reporting and reporting on diversity and 
governance is apparent here: diversity and governance reports are more 
amenable to verification by domestic regulatory bodies because they are 
numerical data-driven, meaning they are more easily fact checked. Local and 
international civil society organizations and inter-governmental bodies such as 
the International Labor Organization can play a supportive role here. They are 
in a position to investigate business related human rights impacts on the ground 
and their documentation of impacts can at least help regulators to raise red flags 
for problematic areas which may prompt a more detailed investigation. The 
dichotomy in approaches to human rights reporting identified in this section 
highlights the needs for a state-based approach to monitoring and enforcement 
for human rights disclosures that marries human rights with business / 
accounting expertise.  
Civil society and investor groups can alert the regulators and other 
relevant authorities of suspected false or misleading statements or to omissions 
of salient risks from reports. The effectiveness of the existing procedures is 
variable. As noted above, the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance 
allows any person with legitimate interest to give official notice to the company 
to comply with the law. If the company does not comply within three months 
of the notice, a judge could oblige the company to publish a plan, under financial 
penalty if necessary. The judge also rules on whether a vigilance plan is 
complete and appropriately fulfils the obligations described in the law. But 
much of the heavy work of identifying and locating vigilance plans and 
identifying and investigating the inadequacies falls to the civil society actors. 
Under the Dutch Child Labor Law, any stakeholder with concrete evidence that 
a company’s goods or services were produced with child labor will be able to 
submit a complaint to that company. If the issue is not resolved, the stakeholder 
will be able to submit the complaint to a regulator. Once a complaint is filed, 
the regulator may issue a legally binding instruction ordering the company to 
conduct the required due diligence and make the appropriate declaration. Again, 
the process of monitoring is very much stakeholder led. Even without specific 
power contained within the disclosure law, a regulator can invite and welcome 
complaints from external parties such as civil society organizations, as the 
Attorney General of California has in respect of CTSCA. As discussed above 
in Part III, this has not proven an effective means of oversight and enforcement. 
 
174 See for an explanation of salience in this context UN Guiding Principles Reporting 
Framework, supra note 167. 
175 There are also restrictions under international law on extraterritorial verification and 
enforcement. As Doorey reminds us, “Canada obviously cannot send inspectors to examine 
workplaces in Bangladesh to verify the accuracy of the information provided by MNCs.” 
Doorey, supra note 25, at 385. 
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Reports from external parties are also used as part of the operating procedure 
for regulators reviewing companies’ non-financial reports, for instance the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK accepts complaints and reviews 
reports on the basis of these.176  The FRC’s procedures are fairly limited in their 
effectiveness, however, as the discussion that follows in next section illustrates.  
3. Enforcement function:  
 
The added value brought by having a regulator with enforcement 
responsibility is to: investigate instances of alleged non-compliance and impose 
sanctions and penalties when non-compliance is found. With respect to 
sanctions for non-compliance, these are not the hallmark of transparency 
provisions, but do feature in the two due diligence laws.177 Although the French 
Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance is relatively new, the enforcement 
mechanism was triggered for the first time in 2019, and has now been used in 
five instances, with two cases so far having reached a court.178 There is yet to 
be a substantive judgment on whether a company has breached its duty of 
vigilance, however, because the question of which court is competent is still 
being litigated,179 this nonetheless represents a significant departure from the 
status quo of minimal, if any, enforcement under the other laws discussed. 
Most transparency laws discussed in this article lack an effective 
enforcement mechanism for non-compliance. Efforts have been made to seek 
sanction for noncompliance with human rights reporting requirements placed 
on certain large / listed companies under UK law. In one instance, civil society 
organization ClientEarth referred mining company Rio Tinto to the relevant 
regulator, the Financial Reporting Council, for failing to report the reality of the 
company’s environmental and social impacts.180 The regulator found that Rio 
Tinto had failed to make material disclosures about serious environmental, 
 
176 The Conduct Committee: Operating procedures for reviewing corporate reporting, 
FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL 1, 3 (Apr. 1 2017), 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/fb5437a7-641b-4c18-b9f8-8baa7f36c7a5/Conduct-
Committee-Operating-Procedures-April-2017.pdf. Information about making a complaint to 
the FRC or raising a whistleblowing concern can be found at https://www.frc.org.uk/About-
the-FRC/Making-a-complaint-to-the- FRC/Whistleblowing.aspx. The UK implemented the 
EU NFRD in the Companies, Partnerships and Groups (Accounts and Non-Financial 
Reporting) Regulations 2016, which added § 414CB to the Companies Act 2006. On 11 
March 2019, the Business Secretary announced that the Financial Reporting Council will be 
abolished and replaced by a new regulator, the Audit, Reporting and Governance Authority. 
177 The French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance and the Dutch Child Labor Due 
Diligence Law. 
178 The two cases are against oil company Total. See Total lawsuit (re failure to respect 
French duty of vigilance law in operations in Uganda), BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
RESOURCE CENTRE, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/total-lawsuit-re-failure-to-
respect-french-duty-of-vigilance-law-in-operations-in-uganda. 
179 Id.  
180 The complaint concerned, in particular, the group’s non-managed Grasberg mine in 
Indonesia. The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund had divested from Rio Tinto on account of 
‘severe environmental damage’ at Grasberg. The mine had been subject to bombings and 
other attacks from local resistance groups and the mine operators continued to pay for mine 
security provided by the Indonesian military, despite the military’s history of human rights 
violations in Papua New Guinea: Referral to the Financial Reporting Review Panel: re the 
Rio Tinto Group Annual Report 2008, CLIENTEARTH (July 2010).  See also Charlotte Villiers, 
Narrative Reporting and Shareholder Value, in DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND SHAREHOLDER 
LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 120-126 (Joan Loughrey ed., 2012).  
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employee, social, and community issues at a mine-site in Indonesia. 181 
Following this finding, Rio Tinto’s directors included more information as 
advised by the FRC in their report and accounts for the following year, and the 
regulator closed its enquiry. No other sanction was applied.182 There is power 
under the Companies Act 2006 for the regulator to apply to court for a 
declaration that the annual reports of a company do not comply with the relevant 
requirements and for an order requiring directors of the company to prepare 
revised accounts. However, this power has never been used.183 This case is 
illustrative of the role adopted by regulators thus far in respect of human rights 
reporting: accepting complaints, reviewing reports, but using sanctions etc. as 
very much a last resort. To avoid situations of ineffective enforcement, we 
envisage the introduction of sanctions and penalties prescribed by the 
transparency or HRDD regulations that have to be imposed by the regulator in 
accordance with such law and not on a discretionary basis. A further added 
value of having a regulator with powers to impose sanctions and penalties for 
non-compliance is the possibility of channeling financial penalties applied to a 
fund which can be used as a contribution to reparations to individuals or 
communities affected adversely by the acts and omissions of the penalized 
corporation.184 
4. Institutional Options and Subject matter expertise: 
 
With the political will and support behind it, a regulator can be 
empowered and resourced to acquire subject matter expertise both on human 
rights and business/accounting. A regulator staffed with appropriate experts and 
supported by sufficient resources would develop greater expertise over time to 
establish indicators on human rights risks on a sectoral and geographical basis, 
as well as developing guidelines for businesses and other stakeholders. In terms 
of understanding risk, the U.S. Department of Labor commissions an annual 
child labor report known as “Sweat and Toil”.185 These are detailed reports of 
instances of child labor around the world, and the gravity of each case. This 
subject matter expertise, if held by regulators of corporate human rights due 
diligence and disclosure, would serve to enhance the ability of stakeholders to 
verify the content of company reports, and would also provide information for 
companies to consider when they assess human rights/modern slavery risks. 
 
181 CLIENTEARTH, supra note 170. 
182 Statement by the Financial Reporting Review Panel in Respect of the Report and Accounts 
of Rio Tinto Plc, FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL (Mar. 15 2011), 
https://www.frc.org.uk/news/march-2011/statement-by-the-financial-reporting-review-panel. 
183 Companies Act 2006, § 456.; Corporate Reporting Review, FINANCIAL REPORTING 
COUNCIL, www.frc.org.uk. 
184 The fund envisaged here is different than the reparation orders made by UK courts under 
the MSA §§ 8-9. In a similar vein, in June 2018 the relevant UK authorities established the 
“General Principles to compensate overseas victims (including affected States) in bribery, 
corruption and economic crime cases” a common framework set up “to identify cases where 
compensation is appropriate and act swiftly in those cases to return funds to the affected 
countries, companies or people” see New joint principles published to compensate victims of 
economic crime overseas, SFO (June 1, 2018), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2018/06/01/new-joint-
principles-published-to-compensate-victims-of-economic-crime-overseas/. 
185 The series began as actual published reports in the 1990s and today is in mobile application 
form, Sweat and Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World,  
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab. 
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We see slow movement in this direction. For instance, proposals made 
so far to improve the MSA disclosures from an oversight perspective include 
provision for a government funded central repository for published statements 
(as was noted above, this is done by the Australian Act. It was also 
recommended by the UK Houses of Parliament Joint Committee on Human 
Rights in its 2017 report on the MSA186), for the government to publish a list of 
companies that must report under the transparency in supply chains clause of 
the Act, 187  and for the establishment of an independent review of modern 
slavery statements made by companies.188 The last of these is the crucial piece, 
according to our argument for regulatory oversight. Whether through an 
enhanced role for the Anti-Slavery Commissioner, or through the creation of 
the sui generis body we recommend, we see this as a necessary step towards the 
accountability goal of the legislation. As noted above, there is a proposal 
currently under consideration in France for additional state oversight for the 
Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance. Rather than taking the form of a 
regulator, this would entail designated individuals within the relevant ministry 
providing guidance to companies on implementation and checking on 
compliance.189  
Commentary to the UNGP 3 acknowledges the role that can be played 
by national human rights institutions (NHRIs) “in helping states identify 
whether relevant laws are aligned with their human rights obligations and are 
being effectively enforced, and in providing guidance on human rights also to 
business enterprises and other non-state actors”.190 For moving the business and 
human rights agenda forward meaningfully at the domestic level, there are 
multiple benefits to be gained from a specialized regulator in this area, as 
acknowledged in the UNGPs as to the role that can be played by NHRIs for 
guidance and enforcement. While we do not envisage the role of the regulator 
proposed here to be carried out by a NHRI,191 a close cooperation between 
NHRIs and the regulator overseeing human rights reporting would be beneficial 
for the latter to establish and develop human rights expertise. We recommend 
the establishment of a sui generis body (or a specialized department within an 
existing body) to tackle both corporate and human rights aspects of the 
reporting. This independent oversight mechanism should have responsibility for 
reviewing reports and providing feedback to a sample of companies on an 
annual basis, similar to the process established through the Danish 
implementation of the EU NFD. We take the view that there should be provision 
for external parties to alert the oversight body, which can investigate the 
accuracy or adequacy of the information, and if needed compel the company to 
correct and complement the disclosure. The oversight body should be able to 
 
186 UK HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3. 
187 FLEX, supra note 122, at 20. 
188 UK HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3. 
189 THE MINISTRY OF THE ECONOMY AND FINANCE, supra note 58. 
190 U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, supra note 22, at UNGP 3 
Commentary. 
191 Though this does not mean that NHRIs cannot be tasked with such a role. In the UK, the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission oversees and enforces gender pay gap reporting 
regulations that place obligations on the public and private sector, see Closing the gap: 
Enforcing the gender pay gap regulations, EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION 
(2018), https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/gender-pay-gap-enforcing-
the-regulations-march-2018.pdf. 
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impose meaningful penalties for failure to comply akin to those in the Dutch 
Child Labor Due Diligence Law. We stress the need the oversight body to have 
specialist subject matter knowledge that goes beyond that of corporate regulator 
to include the complexities of the human rights and modern slavery issues that 
are the subject of the reports. Such specialist knowledge could, for instance, 
come from the commission of “Sweat and Toil” type reports or from close 
cooperation with NHRIs. The oversight body should analyze trends in 
reporting, company practice, and develop training and guidance in relation to 
human rights, modern slavery, cases of forced labor and human trafficking, 
including their drivers and outcomes.192 
VII. Conclusion 
 
We began this article by acknowledging that due diligence and 
transparency can contribute to improving human rights and labor conditions in 
global production networks. But for due diligence and transparency to make a 
stronger contribution to improving corporate accountability and avoid 
potentially masking and legitimating abuses, the legislation should move away 
from heavily relying on a market-based model of accountability. Numerous 
studies and reports show that the existing frameworks have been inadequate. 
One obvious area of improvement concerns the content of the disclosures.  
There have also been calls for more regulatory involvement and a move 
away from the market-led model of oversight, such as establishment of a 
registry of MSA reports in the U.K., or introduction of effective sanctions for 
non-compliance with the reporting standards. In this article, we argued that 
state-based oversight and enforcement is an essential element for human rights 
reporting to be effective. Without this element, even where mandatory due 
diligence is introduced, there remain serious limitations on ensuring accuracy 
and completeness of reports.  
Our contribution to this reform agenda is twofold: first, we argue that 
there is a need to support HRDD and transparency frameworks with a state-
based oversight mechanism that can be also supported by stakeholders. Second, 
we emphasize that oversight for human rights reporting requires a 
fundamentally different approach to institutional expertise and to risks and 
materiality than financial or governance reporting. So far, oversight of a limited 
number of reporting frameworks were entrusted to bodies specializing in 
traditional corporate reporting without staffing these bodies adequately with 
human rights expertise. We urged policymakers to move away from this one 
size fits all model and adopt a sui generis model of oversight marrying 
knowledge of corporate reporting with human rights expertise to verify and 





192 The SEC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Resource Guide is an example of the kind of 
guidance that can be offered to companies by a regulator: A Resource Guide To The U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, FCPA (2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-
resource-guide.pdf. The lack of equivalent state-sponsored guidance for the French Law on 
the Corporate Duty of Vigilance is conspicuous. 
